These new dates are a formality needed in order for the program to secure continued funding.
The Navy date is interesting for a number of reasons. That aircraft has to prove that it can launch and trap on an aircraft carrier along with passing the Navy's operational certification known as an "OPEVAL".
Note also that the USMC has signed up for 80 F-35Cs. It is interesting that one would think that, the C is less complex than a B and even if its carrier qualification was not done, USMC C-models could fly from land bases until (or if) they get their act together. Note that most Harrier operations have been from long airfields.
The other challenge for all services is the question of close air support. There are the issues with the helmet-cueing and early software blocks used by the USMC and USAF for their early IOC. The early blocks will not support the gun-pod (USMC) or much else.
The wars over the past 11 years or so have created a much closer control of close air support attacks. There was the situation where a ground controller brought authorized a JDAM strike on his own head. Another time, Air National Guard F-16 pilots bombed Canadian ground troops in Afghanistan based on a very weak process of target verification. Those are only two of several blue-on-blue incidents.
Close air support today is controlled by a specific briefing/checklist with all items that have to be ticked off on and agreed to by the ground and air partners. ROVER, a kit that--among other things--allows the ground forward air controller and bombing aircraft to share images from aircraft targeting pods is now common doctrine to improve safety and mission success.
The block software path of the F-35 brings this all into question.
The gun for straffing, like it or not has been used many times in the recent wars. A 500 pound bomb has a different safety distance from friendly troops compared to cannon rounds from an aircraft.
For example, in a low threat environment, the USMC Yankee and Zulu helicopters, combined with the USMC C-130J Harvest Hawk, give a Marine and/or Joint commander many more options. The Harvest Hawk can be a cargo aircraft, an air-refueling tanker, or a ground attack and ISR aircraft as needed.
Note also, in the case of the USMC and Army, they have a good variety of artillery options. And for the Army, the Apache helicopter is an outstanding, night, net-centric, close air support aircraft.
Recently, the USAF stood down several flying squadrons. One F-15E squadron that was stood down (for the rest of the year it looks like), was fully combat capable, came back from a successful combat deployment and is its combat capability is now gone. For every month it is deactivated, it will take another month to get it combat capable. So even if it is funded again by the next fiscal budget it most likely will not be combat capable for another year after after funding takes effect.
The F-15E has incredible range, weapon versatility such as JASSM for long range stand-off, and other precision weapons. With its' two-aircrew, the aircraft has shown, over and over, it is valuable for close air-support. The F-35B, that the USMC wants so bad... for its' prime mission of supporting troops on the ground...will not be capable of doing this.
The F-15E is one of the few aircraft (besides long range bombers) that has any relevance in a "Pacific Pivot".
When a general or admiral stands up and states that we need the F-35, they are not being honest with the taxpayer.
7 comments:
I love the Strike Eagle. AF needs to ground more F-16s instead. They fly with 3 fuel tanks, and carry only four missiles because of its terrible range. I really wish we had a 5th gen fighter with the capabilities of the F-15E.
Per default, they need to declare 2015 and 2016, even if those dates would still provide an operationally pre-mature SDD-completed jet.
Whereby, if they reported instead: An IOC F-35A block III squadron would be operational by the end of 2018 and 2019 for USMC...
Congress and Program members would say: what?!?
Another thing to consider is the bluff being played to potential adversarial 'competitors' who are aggressively stepping up the modernization 'race' themselves.
And just to officially put it out there in the public domain that; "we're going to have our cool stuff in the game first", whether it's true or not, is probably an important card to play heading into game too.
The Corps and USAF have painted themselves into a corner with regards to TACAIR. They've announced IOC dates for a minimal level of capability in JSF... at least the Navy has a "plan B". How about a fly-off between the F/A-18F and the IOC JSF?
The OIC announcement is a bit of a con job. The USAF and Marines will declare IOC based on Block 2B software which is 2 AMRAAMs and 2 JDAM's carried internally. Further only aircraft from LRIP 6 (deliveries from 2014) will have the TR-2 hardware to run Block 2B and later hardware.
This has little to do with anything about F35 and the program, US DoD just knows that it is a LOT HARDER to kill a program if it is in production and in service, just look at V22 program as a case study of what to do to stay in business. This jet will have little combat capability and utility probably until after 2020 but, sure, let's put in "service" so Congress won't cancel it. How much you want to bet it won't see any combat until after 2020? Just like F22, yeah, it was in service but was it "really" operational i.e=useful? until now with Block 30 and Block 3 software????
The bull**** starts even before production. Congress did not cancel V-22 because of all the money put into it. Same will go for F-35. We better get something for all that money put into it is the way Congress thinks. LRIP does make it harder to kill too.
I agree with ArmyAbrams on this one...
The B.S., as of late, (such as with JSF/F-35 Program) absolutely starts before production.
Congress definitely needs to grow a set in the future and not allow such BS to repeat itself in the first place for such a fundamentally flawed Program and unsustainable business model from inception.
Critics could have realistically helped out Congress as far back as say, 2007 (after sufficient critical review) and consulted Congress for a more prudent, more sustainable recap path going forward forward.
Because, as ArmyAbrams correctly says... once you get as far as an entrenched LRIP phase, it's much harder to kill a fundamentally flawed and totally unsustainable acquisition Program.
Best to preempt thees boondoggles as early as possible and get back on a prudent and strategic track!
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