The combination of the Canberra class and the short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) version of the Joint Strike Fighter seems to be a credible option for getting back into the fixed wing naval aviation business.
Emphasis added.
$27M STOVL motor. It takes dozens of hours to change. An engine change has not been performed on-ship. How will the jet perform in the Northern hot climate? High cost per flying hour. Dubious capability all around.
Sure. Why not?
As for the Canberra-class LHDs... like the above, if it is expensive, it must be good.
4 comments:
The RAN has never got over losing its fixed wing aircraft carrier in the early 1980s. Some of them are obsessed with getting it back - I once saw a detailed plan for putting Harriers on the LPAs MANOORA and KANIMBLA. Truly bizzare.
Eric, You have to remember that the Navy has never given up trying to get
back a fixed wing at sea capability. It demonstrates the more than anything else the lack of reality at the top of the Navy.
It is astounding that the Navy seems to have such influence on politicians and defence planners in Canberra considering their many follies.
Aircraft carrier operations had to be jettisoned previously because they were not affordably sustainable. The RAN is just not big enough to continually provide escort support for operation of these platforms in active military operations. A few somewhat mythical F-35B or even Harriers would not be adequate to protect the Canberra class if carrying say 1,000 or so troops and their hardware. Just too many eggs in one basket.
Serving Admirals, lobby groups and the defence commentariat at large seem to be pushing the line that Australia must have 4,000 tonne submarines with ultra long range to enable covert operations in the South China Sea. DWP2009 correctly envisaged the ADF primary operating environment to be south of the Equator between the eastern Indian Ocean and the island states of Polynesia, but this has been extended to South East Asia in DWP2013, ostensibly at behest of the US. Foreseeably, a regional foreign policy blunder.
Neither the former CN or CDF were held accountable for the RAN failing to adequately maintain its warships over a couple of decades resulting in a debilitated fleet, some of which have had to be withdrawn from service and replaced.
Nobody was held accountable for the absurd notion to redesign the cockpit and weapons system of the Seasprite just so a bloody Observer could sit up front, resulting in the aircraft having to be operated single pilot over the ocean on dark stormy nights. The Kiwis are now capitalising big time on Australia's mistake.
The architects of DWP2013 have again lost the plot. Australia basically needs and can only afford capabilities to DETER interference with trade routes closer to home and to provide modest forces for regional interventions.
Smaller say Type 212/214 submarines would be quite adequate, optimised air mobility along lines being shed and much smaller capacity amphibious capabilites would have been realistic.
Senator Faulkner speaking as former MinDef was spot on with his analysis of defence planning shortcomings and especially the non-transparency involved. Maybe that is why he was eased out of that role.
The canberra class has no installed (nor plans for?) close in weapons for Anti cruise missile defense.
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