Moreover,the F-35 cost-per-flying-hour estimate has increased by more than 80 percent (in constant dollars) over the interval 2002 to 2010. To ensure that the affordability of the F-35 program is not threatened by continuing O&S cost growth,the USAF is examining alternative strategies to reduce those costs.
I will let the 5th-generation fighter meme pass this time:
As an example, based on the increased security classification requirements for fifth-generation fighter aircraft, increased cost would be necessary to support a higher level of classification for communications lines, sensitive compartmented information facilities, etc.
Bad assumption:
According to the acquisition report, the F-35A is intended to “replace the F-16 and A-10 and complement the F-22” (DoD, 2011). Thus, we assumed that as of 2034, there are no combat-coded A-10 or F-16 available for tasking. On every occasion that the ISC scenarios contain a demand for an F-16 or A-10, we replaced that demand with an F-35 on a one-aircraft-for-one aircraft basis.
Wow. That is brave. No A-10 means a capability gap. Also, I would not count on F-22s being around in 2034.
Under the first absorption excursion (given the set of UTE requirements identified for each of the 28 alternative beddowns), we identified the annual cost associated with generating the required number of sorties, assuming an average sortie duration of 1.4 flying hours and a cost of $18,025 per flying hour.
Brave indeed. $18k per flying hour? Doubtful. Most likely too low. Average sortie duration of 1.4 flying hours? To do what on the training schedule? To be war ready, most missions should be at night and could add up to 5-6 hours per flight given what this aircraft is supposed to do.
For example, few strike missions in Iraq or Afghanistan were an average of 1.4 hours. Fight like you train?
Also an endnote attached to the above quote. This is their assumption of a breakdown of a cost per flying hour for the F-35.
Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) provided us with an F-35A Steady State cost per flying hour (CPFH) in Base Year 2012 dollars. “Steady state” is defined here as the average cost during the period with the maximum number of PAA, which for the F-35A is FY2036–2040. This factor includes cost growth above inflation, and is composed of costs for fuel ($6,604), consumables ($1,793) and depot-level repairables ($9,628).
Overly optimistic since we don't have a real operational squadron with a few years of tribal knowledge. Better to under-promise and over-deliver.
MX !
Here is an interesting assumption on maintenance manpower?
These values suggest that the current maintenance manpower at an 18 PAA ANG F-16 unit, which has approximately 550 drill maintenance positions, could support an increased number of F-35 PAA. The NGB estimates that the total maintenance manpower requirement for a 24 PAA F-35 unit would be 566. Thus, with the current total F-16 manpower, an ANG maintenance unit that supports 18 F-16s could nearly support 24 F-35s. Conversely, ANG F-16 squadrons that transition to the F-35 but maintain 18 PAA would need to absorb a reduction of more than 100 maintenance manpower positions, down to a drill maintenance manpower of 440. This is because the F-35 does not have some maintenance requirements that exist for the F-16, e.g., jet engine intermediate maintenance does not exist for the F-35 although it is required for the F-16.I wonder who told them that was a good idea? Oh yeah...contract maintenance.
And the other flavors of manpower. Maybe for peacetime, all F-35 units should be Guard for the ultimate Excel spreadsheet dream?
Different colors of money and all that, this is what RAND thinks it will cost to run associate MX units of different sizes.
And this for our big bloated Wings:
The rest of the report finishes with a highly pilot-centric careerism tilt. They do not understand or mention that you need to pipeline NCO's with 10 years of experience and Senior-NCO's with 15-20 years experience to keep complex jets going.
Contractor-heavy maintenance or no.
I don't think this RAND report will stand the test of time. Even if it is an interesting exercise.
5 comments:
Night or not aside, just one point on the flying hours is that having all training missions be 5 to 6 hours long is a waste of fuel. You do need some long range navigation exercises, but if it is for example a bombing exercise, efficiency says you should bomb a range right next to your airfield, not fly 5-6 hours to it. Being able to bomb it more times is better practise than insisting on a full length simulation each time.
The problem is that it stated 1.5hrs as an average. I guess one can keep costs down if they don't have any credible combat training for the pilot. The complexity of missions this aircraft will engage in are similar to an F-15E.
Thinking about this, it would be interesting if they could design a flight simulator Program which could be played on the pilots visor and could use the actual aircraft cockpit set on a simulator setting?
e.g., Pilot could sit in cockpit for 1-2 hrs using all aircraft functions (via simulation mode) and view a simulated battlespace displayed on his visor? Then to augment simulated training... switch to real flight mode... and actually take-off and perform a 1 hr 1.5 hr mission?
Upon landing, remain in cockpit and complete an additional 1 hr simulated flight -- the whole time linked together with other pilots, sharing simulated data via network as would on a real operation?
So the effective cockpit training mission could be continuous 4+ hrs, yet actual flight time only comprise of 1-1.5 hrs?
At least the jet's computer could get one heck of a work-out.
"They do not understand or mention that you need to pipeline NCO's with 10 years of experience and Senior-NCO's with 15-20 years experience to keep complex jets going."
I think they do understand that, but they assume it to be a legacy problem inapplicable to the winged wonder that is JSF.
That was the whole point of systems such as the (still not working correctly per latest report) ALIS and CMMS.
Previously tribally complex and human-capital-intensive maintenance and repair would in their vision become something like the humdrum stocking of shelves at a supermarket. Performed by people trained to a not appreciably higher standard than that of shelf stockers.
The magic computer would check schedules constantly, obtain self-reporting feedback from all subsystems, predictively diagnose all impending failures, arrange for appropriate replacements to be shipped automatically, and barely trained line mechs would then swap out the offending components with a few quick whirls of a wrench, following simplified directions on a laptop screen.
This is a technologically plausible concept to some degree -- the post-sales phase of the automobile industry is starting to resemble it -- but the problem is that its implementation has been entrusted to the same idiots at LockMart who have made a hash of all of the rest of the jet.
Now the magic maintenance enabler doesn't work any better than does, say, the magic helmet.
The number of just 960 combatcoded and 803 not comebatcoded really suprised me.
Post a Comment