The F-35 project may be problematic but the bulk of the RAAF's tactical fighter force will require replacement from 2020.
Emphasis mine. Best to change "may be" to "is" and end the sentence after "problematic".
Thursday, January 10, 2013
Muddling through indefensible plans
Considering that the F-35 is a failure and the 2009 Defence White Paper moronic, this is a mild way of stating the problem:
Emphasis mine. Best to change "may be" to "is" and end the sentence after "problematic".
Emphasis mine. Best to change "may be" to "is" and end the sentence after "problematic".
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7 comments:
'...Defence has little room to manoeuvre and it would not be surprising if the financial framework that emerged promoted capital acquisition with superior risk and schedule management, funded in part by reductions in ADF personnel numbers and spending on force sustainment...'
This statement by Derek Woolner reflects determination by the powerful DoD bureaucracy to defend their dysfunctional empire. In portending that savings must come from the military sphere, he completely ignores the cost of running the cumbersome and largely ineffective Public Service component of the defence realm.
Abandoning the tenets of DWP2009 and the associated Defence Capability Plan ought to be the first logical step toward redirecting spending toward rehabilitating diminished capabilities. There is plenty of scope to refine force structuring of all 3 Services and better focusing expenditure, but that of course would require admission that defence policy has for some time now been inappropriately based on the flawed assumptions that Australia is militarily defensible against armed attack and that we can afford to deploy and sustain sizeable expeditionary forces to primarily support US operations (on demand) in faraway places.
If defence spending was pegged at say 7.5 percent of federal government revenue, then scope for savings would inevitably have to focus on the least cost-effective components of the DoD organisation to enable maintenance of an appropriate and adequate level of military preparedness.
Saying the F-35 is a failure many times over does not make it so...despite how much you may hope.
Please describe how it will be "successful".
I for one am still wondering what those 20000 public servants actually do. Given the amount of corporate governance and other non-core business we uniformed types have to do, they certainly aren't reducing our administrative workload. Why are they there again? As to the F35 - its now what, 6 years late and no clear idea when it will see squadron service? Sounds like its failing to me.
To Anon, Jan 11, 2013 6:36 AM
Calling the JSF "a truly 5th generation fighter" worked for a while.
Now even the J-20 and J-31, let alone the Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA and F-22A Raptor, show it isn't and never was going to be Fifth Generation.
No wonder you post anonymously.
"Anonymous said...
I for one am still wondering what those 20000 public servants actually do."
You're in uniform and therefore have probably spent some time in Canberra, and you ask a question as inane as that? What do they do? They fill seats, do crosswords, take stress leave and whatever else is required in between fulfilling their primary, some would say ONLY purpose, voting Labor every time they're required to.
Eric; a bit off thread theme perhaps but the big ogre that hitherto seems largely ignored in Australian defence debate is how military operating costs will continue to soar as a consequence of DWP2009 related inept planning. This is already very significant regarding warships and the ADF helicopter force.
Australia seems now more or less locked into the lead sled Super Hornet which may lead to perhaps 50 or so en toto when the JSF finally falls over. The SH decision virtually torpedoed possible better options.
So what will happen when the aging Hornets reach LOT, and the Hawks and the PC-9 trainers; all maybe happening in the 2020s?
It seems to me there is a pretty good argument to focus more toward cost-effective regional close air support requirements, combining that with training and FAC requirements. Maybe 150-200 Super Tucano manufactured under licence over perhaps 10 or 15 years would be a prospect worth pursuing for Australian defence industry that would be more in keeping with local expertise! And there would seem to be significant potential operating cost savings compared with the F-18/Hawk/PC-9 package.
Methinks timely that people began thinking more about cost-effective ADF force restructuring, while DWP2013 is in seemingly furtive gestation.
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