Even if many of those quotes are grossly wrong.
Some credit to the journo first: True that Australia will have 2 F-35s by 2020. In what kind of quality as measured against a functional combat jet, no one knows.
Let us go with some of the problems of the article:
...caused by delays in the purchase of the cutting-edge Joint Strike Fighter.
"Cutting-edge" only in the level of fraud upon the taxpayer for something of no value.
Australia will take delivery of just two Lockheed Martin JSFs by 2020, indicating the government will need to buy a batch of rival Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornets, which are cheaper but older and less stealthy than the fifth-generation JSF
The JSF is "fifth-generation" only in the minds of marketeers and fraudsters.
While switching to the Super Hornets would not be a slug to the government budget - each is about $40 million cheaper than a JSF - it may mean money is wasted on training and maintaining two different types of fighters.
Only $40M cheaper? And, what price do you put on a lost battle?
Or, lost war?
And some experts say the Super Hornet would be challenged by some of Australia's neighbours' growing air combat capabilities.
If the Super Hornet is "challenged", the F-35 is even more so when one takes the time to read up on all of the serious development problems.
The journo continues with the confusion of not knowing their topic, or being tired:
This appears to confirm what Defence Minister Stephen Smith has hinted at and many experts have suspected: that Defence will replace some of the retiring classic Hornet aircraft with Super Hornets and end up with a mixed fighter fleet rather than the 100 Super Hornets originally proposed. Mr Smith has already asked the US about the price and availability of more Super Hornets.
I think the journo meant, "rather than the 100 F-35s originally proposed."
Coalition defence spokesman David Johnston said the government had broken its pledge in the 2009 white paper to buy 100 JSFs that would have "provided regional domination out to 2030"
For those knowledgeable on this topic, any reading of David Johnston's previous words on such matters, show that his total fund of knowledge on air power can be written on the inside of a matchbook with a large sized crayon.
"The revelation … that this promise has been reduced to just two aircraft [by 2020] is a further testament to Minister Smith's incompetent handling of the Defence portfolio," he said.
Smith isn't the sharpest tool in the bag, however, delaying on the Just So Failed is better than committing to it. A better solution for Smith? The New Air Combat Capability (NACC) Office, their motto, "Semper fidelis ad Lockheed Martin", indicated in a 2004 brief that if the F-35 steam-roller that killed the original Air 6000 plan didn't workout, we would start over with picking a legacy Hornet replacement. I am curious how much more failure in the program is needed. A small snapshot of the stupidity, corruption and dishonesty to the Australian public thus far:
“It’s about $37 million for the CTOL aircraft, which is the air force variant.”
- Colonel Dwyer Dennis, U.S. JSF Program Office brief to Australian journalists, 2002-
". . . US$40 million dollars . . "
-Senate Estimates/Media Air Commodore John Harvey, AM Angus Houston, Mr Mick Roche, USDM, 2003-
" . . US$45 million in 2002 dollars . ."
-JSCFADT/Senate Estimates, Air Commodore John Harvey, Mr Mick Roche, USDM, 2003/2004-
". . average unit recurring flyaway cost of the JSF will be around US$48 million, in 2002 dollars . . "
-Senate Estimates/Press Club Briefing, Air Commodore John Harvey, 2006
". . the JSF Price (for Australia) - US$55 million average for our aircraft . . in 2006 dollars . ."
-Senate Estimates/Media AVM John Harvey ACM Angus Houston, Nov. 2006-
“…DMO is budgeting around A$131 million in 2005 dollars as the unit procurement cost for the JSF. .”
-AVM John Harvey Briefing, Office of the Minister for Defence, May 2007-
“There are 108 different cost figures for the JSF that I am working with and each of them is correct”
-Dr Steve Gumley, CEO of the DMO, Sep./Oct. 2007-
“…I would be surprised if the JSF cost us anymore than A$75 million … in 2008 dollars at an exchange rate of 0.92”
-JSCFADT Dr Steve Gumley, CEO DMO, July 2008-
". . Dr Gumley's evidence on the cost of the JSF was for the average unit recurring flyaway cost for the Australian buy of 100 aircraft . ."
-JSCFADT/Media AVM John Harvey, Aug. 2008-
Confirmed previous advice i.e. A$75 million in 2008 dollars at an exchange rate of 0.92,
-JSCFADT Dr Steve Gumley, CEO of the DMO, Sep. 2009-
" ...about $77 million per copy."
-Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Feb. 2008.
But back to the article in question:
Analysts broadly argue the JSF is the best fighter on the market, although many say the Super Hornet will probably suffice. Andrew Davies, senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said the JSF was "far stealthier and has a much more powerful and integrated set of senses than the Super Hornet has".
Again I would think the journo meant "sensors" and not "senses".
The only difference between Senator Johnson and Mr. Davies on air power issues is that Davies has a slightly bigger matchbook, but not by much.
Sam Roggeveen, a strategic analyst and editor of the Lowy Institute's Interpreter blog, said the Super Hornet would represent a compromise but "I would argue we don't need the JSF yet"
Sam is a wonderful guy, and I like him. However, I would disagree with him strongly. I would say, given what we know now, we do not need the JSF...ever.
Former defence minister Brendan Nelson, who bought Australia's existing 24 Super Hornets, said a mixed fleet to 2030 should give Australia what it needed, given other governments were hit by similar budget constraints as Australia.
"If the government did choose to (buy Super Hornets), Australia would still have extraordinary air combat capability and would be well placed in relation to our strategic competitors,'' he said.
Who could disagree with Nelson? He believed the PowerPoint lies back in 2006. Kudos to the Boeing sales force for seeing an easy mark. Well played Boeing. Well played. Even the part of demonizing the F-111 to help the sales pitch.
The fox, telling the farmer, the definition of a chicken.
But Peter Goon, a former RAAF engineer now with the independent experts Air Power Australia, was more pessimistic, saying Australia was ''already outmatched in the region'' on air combat. ''If you send out Super Hornets against the Sukhoi Su-35s, few if any of them will come back,'' he said.
Hard to argue with that. It is curious to note that APA are the only team that have offered viable and hard-data F-35 warnings to our elected officials.
For years.
And, now the chickens are coming home to roost. Funny how those with all the alleged special access to the program (their initials are "NACC") have been unable to properly guide our elected officials on the dangers. Unable to the point of grossly misleading.
Blatant F-35 cheerleading and proxy salesmanship.
And you paid millions for that waste. Multiple trips to Cow Town, other similar junkets, the whole lot.
The Super is probably the wrong aircraft for Australia. We should start with a clean sheet of paper for the legacy Hornet replacement. If the next white paper said that, it would show big thinking.
Neither the Super nor the F-35 are capable of facing emerging high-end threats. That is the job of the F-22. Against non-high-end threats, the Super beats the F-35 all over the practical ops map.
-The Super has a cost per flight hour less than half that of the F-35.
-The Super has a two aircrew option, great for use as a fast forward-air-controller, hand off via networking to other platforms and other work-intensive tasks.
-The Super has blue force tracker, and ROVER capability. Without this, no joint coalition commander will let an aircraft do close air support work. The F-35 will not see this capability in finished form. All one has is a PowerPoint slide showing notional post F-35 BlockIII feature hopes and dreams.
-The Super can perform buddy tanking.
-The Super has proper, multi-aspect self-defense. That is a towed-decoy, defensive jamming and sensor coordination of threats. The F-35? When it goes naked to the threat, (stealth not being a total solution), it only has forward-aspect in-band (X-band) jamming on the promise you can do such a thing with a thermally, and power-limited radar kit. Oh yeah, and some expendable decoys. This puts at at risk against even legacy threats.
-The survivable limits of the F-35 get worse when gun or explosive fragment damage is involved. The Super? Well, I did see the results of a collision between legacy Hornets once some years ago. They were out of Dobbins, Georgia. One with horrific damage. They both landed safely. The Super improves upon the legacy Hornet ability to survive with even better redundant systems. Don't count on that too much with the latest known F-35 woes.
-The Super works today. This includes known sortie rates.
For the F-35, the old saying goes: “That which can be asserted without evidence, can be dismissed without evidence.”
No "analyst" has shown any convincing evidence why we should hand over billions on a troubled F-35 aircraft that is unlikely to meet future combat needs, and, is unlikely to be affordable to own and operate.
59 comments:
Eric,
Are you advocating a mixed fleet of Super Hornets plus another aircraft? Since you are against the F-35, what would you propose instead?
I have been following the Eurofighter Typhoon with interest, but its development has slowed because of of Europe's budget woes.
Need to answer the critical question first with which David Hurley and his cohort are wrestling:
What to do in the post 2015 stealth-on-stealth/counter-stealth world?
Since they seem to be struggling a bit and have been for over a decade, do you have any ideas you could offer them?
What I am advocating is that we get government to do their job and spend tax payer money wisely.
Buying more Super Hornets based on a previous mistake that was only to serve 10 years, is just dumb.
The government should have a tender process where all available fighter aircraft that actually work are considered for the legacy F-18 replacement. That is what an intelligent purchaser of military equipment would do.
Note, that the F-35 does not qualify because there is no working go-to-war example that has run in operational squadrons (not test squadrons) for a few years to gauge its true worth. Which means at the earliest, we won’t be able to evaluate the F-35 until the 2020s.
The White Paper should state that a competition will be started for the legacy F-18 replacement. That includes a requirement that may, or may not be, status quo. Maybe a true requirement would show that we need less than 100 new aircraft. Maybe a true requirement would show that we need 124 or 148 aircraft.
This process also gets best industry off-sets in place via competition.
If the entrenched Defence bureaucracy continues with their stupid ways, they are more of an enemy to our economy than a future enemy.
Hi Eric,
I agree that we should start with a clean sheet of paper for the legacy F/A-18A/B Hornet replacement.
My first proposal is the Australian specialized F-15E+ development program... the F-15AU.
Second proposal is the Sukhoi Su-35S Super Flanker-E. There were reports I heard about Sukhoi Co. approached US-aligned Australia in 2002, offering Su-30 family aircraft, and the Su-35 targeted as the prime "export" fighter.
Eric et all, what do you think of the Grippen NG? Im a big fan of that plane I admit, but Im not sure about how it would be down under. The high/low mix and engine sharing of the F-15 and F-16 worked really well, why we arent still following that model here in the states is a mystery to me. What Im thinking is that the savings likely to result from the NG would allow for investment firt in training, and then R and D. Just as the F-15 served as the basis for the F-16, I wonder if the Grippen could serve as the basis for a 2 engine long range strike or long loiter EW platform. Overall I think 1 engine is the way to go, but in the part of the pacific having a two engine option thats affordable and shares parts would e pretty tempting.
Speaking of the F-15, for all the money going into getting the F-35 working Im sure we coulfd make those legacy fighters better. Look at how well Russia has been at building of off the basic Su-27. Or thier is always a yet thought of solution. There is risk, but wasn't there just as much resistance to starting over with a "white piece of paper" when John Boyd got involved with it as thier is now ehen ever someone looks at F-35 alternatives. The funny thing is that the logic of the resistance is something akin to "how dare you want to replace an unproven idea with an unproven idea." Of course the F-35 idea is largely disproven, and a "white piece of paper" could be a place where proven ideas are assessed and possibly combined.
One of the things that really sparked my doubts in the F-35 is the appearant desire of its supporters to shut down the discussion of alternatives, rather than thier wanting to be part of that discussion. The thimg I dont get is that with all the money going into developing bleeding edge tech for the F-35, why cant some of that tech go into another platform, even its just via a pod or on a pylon. Im pretty sure that wouldnt work with the way they are doing some things and failing to do some others, but doesnt that just imply that the design and engineering of the F-35 are at best lineae short term investments? It looks to me like the stealth first, marketing driven, bleeding edge, no one person in charge school of aircraft design is the model of doing things thats truly guilty of starting over when we dont have the time or money to do so. And what happens if anti stealth technologies take less than a decade or two to develop? How will that be countered? All in all, reading Lockmart press releases disguised as journalism and boards like F-16.net's, Im increasingly of the opinion that all of the futurist fantasizing about this thing are small picture people who are forgetting that all this technology good and bad has to crammed into one fighting airplane.
For all the times Ive heard defenses of this problem or this problem, its always isolated and never in the context of a bigger picture, short of falling back on faith in stealth invulnerability. Ive actually heard people defend ideal solutions weighing hundreds of pounds more than the next best good enough option, as if they forget this is an airplane were talking about, one that has to deal with, you know, gravity.
I absolutely agree that there should be a rigorous tender process. Indeed, I have advocated that on this blog and others.
But given the range of aircraft currently on the market, do you have any thoughts on what might be the best choice (or choices) to replace the Classic Hornets?
Also what about a phased approach - replace some or all of the Classics with the best immediately available option (determined by competitive tender), and then wait a few years to see how the industry develops before replacing the Supers(also by tender)...
There was a damning report of the Super Hornet in areas of critical operational requirements, while praising it for its improved aircraft carrier capabilities when compared to the original F/A-18A-D Hornet - something not high on our list of essential criteria.
Three sentences on page eight of the report say it all: "The consequences of low specific excess power in comparison to the threat are poor climb rates, poor sustained turn capability, and a low maximum speed. Of greatest tactical significance is the lower maximum speed of the F/A-18E/F since this precludes the ability to avoid or disengage from aerial combat. In this regard, the F/A-18E/F is only marginally inferior to the F/A-18C/D, whose specific excess power is also considerably inferior to that of the primary threat, the MiG-29."
The F/A-18E/F has a similar performance deficiences to the F-35 which the aircraft has a short range and does not have the performance envelope of a true air superiority fighter compared to the large fighters (with high capability). They will be outclassed by the Su-27/30 Flanker family of fighters by most regional nations in all key performance parameters, aerodynamic, bigger weapons payload, radar / sensor performance by widely available fighters.
Apart from the new Su-27/30 family proliferating across the regions: the F/A-18E/F is acknowledged in the report as being no match for even the older and newer MiG-29 family. Space precludes quoting the report's comments on the multitude of other areas where the Super Hornet is inferior to the 1970s-designed and 1980s-built original F/A-18 aircraft.
Admittedly the Block II Super Hornet has a new APG-79 AESA radar and some electronic components not in the version Coyle gave evidence on, but the fundamental airframe and performance remain unaltered: it is heavier, slower, larger and uglier (its radar signature did not measure up to expectations) than the normal Hornet.
Evidently the underwing aero-acoustic environment and resulting vibrations are so violent that some weapons are being damaged in transit to the target on a single flight - dumb bombs are fine in that environment but not long-range missiles containing sophisticated and relatively delicate components. To me there is nothing super about this Hornet; perhaps "Super Dog" is a better descriptor.
I remember a couple years ago Boeing had talked about the possibility of integrating the meteor to the SH. So couldn't the australian government pose a condition that the meteor ough to be integrated if more aircraft were to be puchased?
It would be a great add-on to the super hornet and it would take at least 10 more years to get something similar from the US ( the 120D is not available for export, and even the 120D2 with its dual pulse motor won't be as good ).
In particular the australian growlers with meteors would have the first shot while they're jamming the flankers, and in visual range the SH is still a very dangerous opponent due to its excellent pointing capability and 9X/JHMCS.
What's more the 9X block 2 has near BVR capability.
It's really the avionics and the missiles that would render the super hornet effective.
If we could get meteors in Canada, and if the airfract could be upgraded to block IIIs later relatively easily ( with the plumbing for the CFT and the spot for the IRST already there), I wouldn't necessarily be against SHs for us instead of F-35s, IF there is a significant cost advantage, which remains to be seen.
And Canada have the same problem. Replacing F/18 with SH or something else.
Might this be Gripens decade as the budgets get slashed and deficits sky rockets.
It might not be the best there is but there are no other aircraft with more bang for the buck. And between no aircraft and some aircraft. Some is far better.
A revised national strategic assessment ought to be the basis for Defence White Paper 2013 and not one that is politically orchestrated to fit prior flawed planning.
From DWP2009 (Chapter 7.2): 'The principal task for the ADF is to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations without relying on the combat or combat support forces of other countries. This means that the ADF has to be able to control our air and sea approaches against credible adversaries in the defence of Australia, TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED TO SAFEGUARD OUR TERRITORY, CRITICAL SEA LANES, POPULATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE...(MY EMPHASIS)'
It is militarily impossible to defeat armed attack on continental Australia and the logistics of invasion for any potential aggressor are just too forbidding. Nor is it possible to safeguard population and infrastructure when borders are wholly porous and the Federal Government really has no idea (by their own admission) just how many people enter the country illegally. It would be just so easy for small well-trained groups to paralyse infrastructure to exert political influence.
The practicable and affordable primary military tasks are to DETER interference with sea corridors and provide adequate capabilities for regional military interventions; which beg questions regarding ADF force structures.
Is it any longer realistic to maintain 2 strike and 4 fighter squadrons if maritime strike deterrence and close air support for ground forces are the obvious paramount requirements? And what then are the most suitable platforms for both of these requirements?
The Super Hornet acquisition and the associated small (somewhat unproven) tanker force are not an adequate substitute for what could have been achieved by an enhanced F-111 regarding maritime strike capability; but that is history. Nor would the SH be an adequately pure air combat platform to replace the F/A-18, if emphasis on that capability could be justifiably argued.
I am a John Boyd disciple and he was dead right insisting that the single engine F-16 should not be overloaded with systems shaping it more toward multi-role capability.
Considering the vast amount of research that had been done regarding F-16 platform enhancement, the huge mistake made by US politicians was to give the JSF development to Lockheed Martin. Optimised F-16 versions would be so very marketable to largely replace the 4,400 or so produced for worldwide military needs.
In my view, neither the Super Hornet or the JSF are adequate for Australian maritime strike capability requirements and the Super Hornets should be easily traded back for the US Navy, if a better maritime strike deterrence option emerges downstream. Perhaps defence planners should leave better maritime strike capability somewhat in abeyance for a time and focus more on an adequate replacement for the F/A-18, Hawk and PC-9!
I disagree, Bushranger.
If an adequate replacement to the 'sufficient' legacy Hornet is required, then wouldn't a relatively cheap Super Hornet (even as a Leased stopgap option) also be fine, given it's fresh 6,000 hr +/- operational life expectancy and modern avionics ready to go?
Even an -E variant would be plenty capable in CAS role with RAAF's Litening pod (updated to G4+ 1k FLIR standard) on the centerline station and next-gen precision mini-munitions under the wings.
Anti-maritime capability? It largely depends on the munition being acquired for the capability. Don't focus so much on platform; focus more on performance and capability of the actual 'deterrence-enforcing' munition being armed on the modern Tactical platform.
You favor a dumbed down F-16? (What exactly would you wish to omit from your next-gen order? A modern EW management suite? Modern displays? High data transfer rate and modern computer? New weapon system integration? AESA w/SAR, IRST or SNIPER pod? MAWS system?)
The F-16 - thanks to it's largely state of the art, built-to-order avionics and weapons-integration package 'potential' - is still one of the most capable and cost-effective 'all-in-one' multi-role fighters going! Able to pull off Air Defence, Maritime strike, Strike and CAS... the modern F-16 is credible due in large part to it's 'loaded-up' capacity for 'good enough' modern avionics.
That being said... likely a great jet, probably best conceived for Australia's F-111/Hornet replacement requirements without ever being marketed or considered for that, would have arguably been the F-16XL concept.
As for Nick's comments above, I'd concur with him that it would depend on how any follow-on Super Hornet orders were configured and actually armed, which would determine it's value and level of credibility. Definitely too, get the next-gen F-18E/F plumbed for a future CFT already! Forget the wing tank and pylon altogether which will also save wing crack durability and extend life as a bonus, let alone save on annual fuel costs due to decreased drag. Accelerate the APG-79's upgrade development.
And perhaps in addition to Nick's support for integrating METEOR, also evaluate and study potential for the proposed air-launched Stunner? That round would potentially add greater 'First-shot' capability as well, over the AIM-120C7/D.
Peter,
>> And Canada have the same problem. Replacing F/18 with SH or something else.
Might this be Gripens decade as the budgets get slashed and deficits sky rockets.
It might not be the best there is but there are no other aircraft with more bang for the buck. And between no aircraft and some aircraft. Some is far better.
The problem with the gripen NG is that it is not mass produced, which it is a serious handicap for its cost effectiveness, especially when the F-35 is mass produced in 5 years.
Other than that it would be a great fighter, especially with the EPE engine. Its single engine gives it a low signature vs the super hornet, and the SH will always have its crappy drag when it uses its pylons.
Sometimes I have this crazy idea... modify the F-35's front fuselage and mate it with the rest of a gripen NG. There would be a significant amount of work to do to merge the 2 but it would make for a great relatively low cost fighter. The F-35's front section will be mass produced for the F-35 and already includes what makes the F-35 very effective, its radar, EOTS, and advanced cockpit. It would also lower the frontal RCS. The gripen NG body would give the aircraft very good aero -performance in particular with the EPE engine, and a much lower operating cost. Almost everyone, even the US, could buy a mix of F-35s with this F-35-gripen hybrid. They would have a lower operating cost than 2 completely different aircraft and it would increase aircraft count. Stealth is not needed all the time. What's more pilots could fly both without much difference.
It may not be that crazy when you consider what they did with the Su-34.
The JAS-39E/F Gripen NG is inexpensive to procure and operate. If offers performance and features found in much more expensive fighters, and it certainly has faster acceleration and more agile than the F-35/Super Hornet.
But the downside for the Gripen NG it's a single engine plane like the F-35, and F-16, and should not be acceptable to Australia for that reason, because it does not have long-range that Australia's large landmass requires, and does not have dual-engine for backup for the over water operations. Also the Gripen NG is underpowered and far behind the F-15, Su-27/30 family, Eurofighter, and Rafale in technology. Another big disadvantage of the Gripen NG is the limited weapons load - it doesn't carry enough advanced missiles/guided bombs required for Australia's role for air-to-air combat and strike capability.
Sorry guys if you disagree with with my point of view about the Gripen NG not a suitable option as a F/A-18A/B Hornet replacement. Is just that we shouldn't be wasting too much billions of dollars acquiring just low capability fighters that have no practical use against the Flanker family, upcoming PAK-FA, J-20 and J-31 threats.
Although most or none of the F-16 or Gripen aircraft suffered any engine failure, (except there were first two accidents for the Gripen occurred in 1989 and 1993; which these were related to flight control software issues, one aircraft was destroyed in a ground accident during engine testing) while modern engines are very reliable, (but don't forget modern engines can fail) the loss of the engine over water or artic guarantees the loss of the F-16, Gripen and JSF, and also requires that the search and rescue assets commit to support any operational deployment of F-16s, Gripen and JSFs. BTW small fighters with short range are only ideal for smaller air forces in Europe, some Asian/South American nations to operate them is because their range is not as important and they are surrounded by the vast land areas, and more surrounding air bases (for any emergency situations e.g. hydraulic or engine failures). They can be equipped with either single or two engines (Actual range varies with mission).
The use of single engine was considered an acceptable compromise required to fly short distance missions. Australia has entirely different operational needs, as most roles involve long range or long endurance missions over the ocean.
I'll put up the description about the combat radius/ferry range of these aircraft, if you want to make comparisons of which aircraft is best suited for the F/A-18A/B Hornet replacement.
F-15E Strike Eagle – 1,000 nm (1,800 km), 3,100 nm (5,745 km) with external tanks and CFTs
Su-35S Super Flanker-E - 850 nm (1,580 km), 2,222 nm (4,500 km) at high altitude with internal fuel and 3,611 nm (6,500 km) w/one top-up.
Dassault Rafale - 988 nm (1,830 km), 2,000+ nm (3,700+ km) with external tanks and CFTs
Eurofighter Typhoon - 750 nm (1,389 km), 2,046 nm (3,790 km) with external tanks
F-35A Lightning II JSF (Just So Failed) - 540 nm (1,100 km), 1,200 nm (2,220 km) with 2 external tanks and internal fuel.
SAAB JAS-39C/D Gripen - 432 nm (800km), 1,727 nm (3,200 km) with external tanks. The later model JAS-39E/F Gripen NG - 701 nm (1,300 km), 2,197 nm (4,070 km) with external tanks.
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet - 390 nm (722 km), 1,798 nm (3,330 km) with external tanks.
Eric,
Take a look at this new article I've just found, you'll probably like it. It's called Introducing The Super Arrow – An Alternative to the F-35? (for Canada)
http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2013/01/29/introducing-the-super-arrow-an-alternative-to-the-f-35/
Including the website www.superarrow.ca
Then you can post your point of view about this aircraft on your blog.
Regards
Hello Anonymous (Jan29/2:01PM); you may have misinterpreted a couple of my points.
F-16 development is of course history, but John Boyd was a staunch advocate that some platforms should be purpose built; ergo the F-16 as a pure lightweight air combat fighter aircraft and the A-10 which is in a proven class of its own. He detested the multi-role concept and envisaged the LWF as having high thrust/weight ratio, larger wing area than the USAF supported with lighter wing loading and even better fuel fraction. To optimise its air combat functions, he advocated equipping the platform purely for that role to enhance foregoing features. That is not 'dumbing down' the platform. Other specialised versions have of course been created like the Israeli F-16I 'Sufa' more suited to attack functions (see this link for assorted Israeli weaponry: http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/aircraft/f-16i/F-16I.html ).
Over time, some successful fighter aircraft were improved and adapted for air to ground roles
(e.g. Spitfire, Mustang, Sabre) which probably led to the derivation of the term fighter-bomber. But installing assorted attack gear to create multi-role versions inevitably degrades air combat performance in some respects. I do not abide the argument that acquiring a multi-role platform enables significant savings in training and support costs as there are differing air training needs for air combat and attack roles. The smallish RAAF has of course trained for both over years but there were specialised air combat and close air support units in the USAF for some time. Similarly in the Luftwaffe in latter years of WW2.
Australia acquired the F/A-18 in lieu of the F-16 mainly because a particular Group Captain was permitted too much influence over the acquisition decision, he being adamant on twin-engine capability. Considering the proven reliability of high performance jet engines these days, likely attrition of single-engine platforms due to non-combat losses is quite acceptable compared with the much higher acquisition and support costs for twin-engine types. Adding complexity and weight to any platform of course results in the need to burn more fuel to carry more fuel. I strongly disagree with the proposition that the F-16 would not have been suited to the Australian operating environment. Role optimised versions would have far better range than other single-engine types previously operated that we staged via some suitable Australian airfields when ferrying trans-continent. Offshore combat radius is more relevant than ferry range and combat SAR resources are also required to support twin-engine types.
Finally, I crystallize a thought that the air defence/air combat role may become a lessened priority for Australia, if an updated national strategic assessment is objectively conducted and not just shaped to support hitherto flawed defence planning. However, if Australian Governments condone the nation being sucked into more conflicts in faraway places through being pressured by the US, Brits, NATO, UN or whoever, then the push to acquire a sophisticated air combat capability to accomplish air superiority will obviously be ongoing. Consider me a heretic if you wish, but as a former air defender (amongst other roles), I believe the role now has lesser regional relevance than maritime strike and close air support capabilities. Like it or not, it seems obvious to me that the ADF is going to have to be substantially shrunk within affordable defence capacity considering the broader economic imperatives for Australia over the coming 10 to 20 years.
Well the Gripens range and single engine are potential drawbacks. As far as range goes, I think Australians are going to want to think long and hard about what they what kind of combat radius they need, which might be different than what they want. Regardless of whether or not the Gripens range is ideal or good enough, the NG (especially with 2x450 gallon drop tanks, which still leaves room for six missles) is better in regard to range than either the F-18 or the f-35. Is that correct?
In respect to the single engine issue, I really wonder of thats am issue these days. Even so, reliable engines in a two engine plane will give you that redundancy. Im still dreaming of a Gripen/ Gripen derived split twin engine plane with a lifting body, and I wonder if having a shorter range plane, ideally used in better weather except in wartime, with a price tag that would allow for greater numbers, mixed with a longe range twin engine fighter for front line and all weather duty, would work down under. I really dont know. If this is the case, I think the legacy fighter mafia aircraft might still be tempting.
In any case, it looks like Australia might have to settle for the dreaded interem solution in the short term, and this is where Gripen would definately have a cost advantage. Even if Australia finds it dream fighter and can afford to marry her, it wont do much good if the budgeting to wedding cost good pilots, either in old planes that go down, a drastically shrinking air force, even in the interem, or by making pilots play video games because theres no money for training.
The futurist in the airforce, and thier cheerleaders, forming a shape shifting Lockmart press core, really have affected the debate. Its always hardware vs hardware, and in the dream world of total BVR dominance this may be true, but Im old fashioned and I really think that any procurement decision must allow for real world training, and lots of it. Liekwise, the idea that multirole fighters are cheaper is mostly poppycock, but it frames many debates. A no/few frills dog fighter has the potential to provide air superiority, and to do so at low enough cost that a dedicated CAS platform can be procurred. This is especially true if you consider the contributions a Super Tucano can make, much less an affordable A-10 or A-10 derivative. The stealth only nature of most debates really does frill free fighters a dis service, because even at the etreme of having a plane with passive only sensors, a plane with lift and thrust to spare can always mount any neccissary gadgets via pod or pylon, and such planes could even be designed with add on integration and even modularity in mind.
BTW, the Superarrow looks good, but I fear its a bit too ambitious. Sadly, any outlier designs good enough to work arent likely to be great enough to sell, and any design that is great enough to sell isnt likely to be good enough to work. Still, love the wings and the high bubble canopy. It just looks like its too big and heavy, but if Canadians can build with hammers like Russians, rather than scapels like Americans, it might be just right.
Thanks for the reply, Bushranger.
I will agree to disagree though on some aspects of the overall strategic contingencies for Australia (being a MAJOR economic and modern social/political member of the world community). That is, some future contingencies not being mutually-exclusive.
A credible AUTONOMOUS capacity for deterrence for various hypothetical future strategic contingency, as well as in a justified, coalition-partnership contingency, could be valid.
Recall some RAAF history as a precedent as well. By the end of WWII, Australia had ordered (including license-built) around 500 'cutting-edge', MULTI-ROLE, P-51 fighters...
With respect to your thoughts on Boyd's F-16 vision (and true LWF) of the day though? Well, let's just say that a 'true LWF' today (and geared up to take on the 'next-gen' capability) would need to fit a helluva lot more than a 1970s, early 80s vision for light-weight fighter requirements - eg, merely including a couple wing-tip heat seekers and a gun.
At it's introduction though, the early F-16 was truly mediocre, kinda risky (engine wise as noted) and of course required significant revisions and updates along the path to become more reliable and credible, ie, kept up to date and worthy.
An hypothetical RAAF block 25 or 30 F-16 introduced in the 80s instead of Hornet probably would have suffered some peace-time engine failure attrition too (not yet being equipped with the most modern and reliable engines).
So as a counter-viewpoint, a modern-day/next-gen light-weight air combat Fighter would actually be prudent to come equipped w/ modern day AESA, modern EW management suite to enable modern passive digital receivers and defensive jamming (and possible towed jammers), a capable Air-air IRST, probable MAWS system, sufficient data linking, tactical modern computer with fast data transfer, sufficient displays to handle the situational awareness and visual cues, etc, Universal interface, open architecture and possibly even a pathway to a future ATDIRCM system in the near-futre.
Personally, I think a good near-term concept per credible 'LWF' would be the Gripen NG. A good early/mid-2000s 'medium-weight' Fighter example -- taking Boyd's fuel-fraction and adaptability basis -- would have been an F-16XL type concept.
What could be credible and sound though, would be to take a joint-trainer/Light-fighter T-50 or TA-50 eg, (with a couple dog-fight missiles and baseline radar) used in a niche/limited air sovereignty/combat role and jointly as an advanced trainer (for USAF?).
Now, how does all of this combined conjecture tie into the relevant Blog thread of 'Playing chicken with the Hornet replacement'?
Very conceivably, the Hornet could be valued and evaluated as a 25 year service life fighter. Period.
Given that assessment, if true, then it's possible that RAAF is in a definite pickle now, thanks to the gamble (game of chicken) played with originally expecting/pre-conceiving the cheap operational F-35 plan as was.
How to get out of that pickle is part of the apparent blowback, 'gap' and increased cost and risk in having to scramble now for the various recap stopgaps, revisions and Plan B's being forced to take.
Is the Super Hornet therefore a 'good choice', when taking everything into account?
The answer is probably that it's the 'only' prudent and least-risky contingency being forced to take. It's arguably a scenario now where decision makers and battle planners will need to look at what they 'have to take to war'... not what they 'wish to take to war'... and how to now best equip them and best optimize them to enable capabilities and deterrence.
Anon 4:11
I think that in terms of WWII multi role aircraft its important to remember that all fighter aircraft at the time flew within flight envelopes suitable for CAS, or at least close to it. Even then, not all fighters could fulfill multiple roles, and most that could were inferior at secondary roles than purpose built aircraft. A good example of this would be the Stuka, that made an incredible CAS platform yet was an easy target outside a combined arms enviornment, and it sure wasnt no dog fighter. As for the Mustang, Im pretty sure it wasnt designed or purchased as a multi role fighter, and this is probably why it was such a great fighter and played such a big role in establishing air superiority, especially with its long legs. Even then, one can argue other planes were superior, especially in ground attack and close air support. Still, its contribution to the war effort were huge, but a major factor in that was the amoints of P-51s put into combat and the amount of training available to P-51 pilots (know that this is a credit to the Mustang, not a criticism). Later in Korea, it made sense to use the Mustang in CAS, as it had greater loiter time and situational awareness than the faster jets, but even with all the contributions it made it suffered heavy losses to groundfire, to which it had no major resistance.
As for the F-16 and LWF, there are plenty of defenders whom you can find online, including Mr Sprey himself. His chapter in the Pentagon Labyrinth (free at pogo.org, eaaily googled), is a very interesting read that gives an insight into his thinking, and thus the LWF and the F-16. I recommend you read it, as you seem to think in a single piece of hardware vs a single piece of hardware paradigm. While a heavy and exoensive gadget ladden plane may be tactically superior in a one on one match, and Im not saying it is, its important to think in terms of one fighting force verses another, and over time. This is where the Americans lack of focus on operational art gets us into trouble, and this is why the LWF mafia wasnt just concerned with plane vs plane thinking, but considered things like training, numerical superiority, sortie rates, procurement opportunity cost, and budgetary sustaibability.
While Im obviously of the mind that BVR kills are not guarenteed, and that training usually trumps hardware, I think its easy to underestimate the BVR potential of small simple fighters. With modern data links, only one plane in a formation would need to carry the active sensor, possible on a pylon, needed for any one type of BVR missle carried by a formation. With good air or ground based radar platforms, even this might not be needed. The point Im trying to make is that with pylons, pods, and sensors within munitions, you can carry what you need when you need it if you have a flexible avionics suite.
Now Im not saying that multi role aircraft cant work, and work well, but its not something we can force on every platform. For one thing weight matters a lot when trying to get into many performance envelopes. In general, I think multi role resighm really only works for different task that are performed more or less with the same envelopes. Also, I think fast and cheap modularity are the future of multi role design, not hight cost all at once solutions.
Gripens single engine might be a problem for Austalia with all its surrounding water. Even though Sweden have lots of water to defend they do have shorter distances to land then Australia have.
It would be more logical choice for Canada with an arctic characteristic pretty much the same as Sweden.
Anyway the Gripen C/D have managed a 10/1 kill ratio in the red flag 13-2 which is pretty ok considering it lacks in some radar areas.
I think that Gripen NG would be a very interesting solution from a capability and financial standpoint.
A small clarification, the 1300 km combat radius for Gripen NG includes a half hour on station. Excluding time on station would provide a comnat radius of around 1500km.
When it comes to single engine reliability, mechanical malfunctions of the engine itself is very seldom the cause of an engine out. When it is, the engine has a nasty reaction of throwing engine parts around it with a high risk of damaging any second engine.
Instead, the most common causes are historically flameouts and breakdowns in subsystems such as ignition and fuel systems.
Those risks can be met with carefull design of fan and compresor including birdstrike hardening and air intakes. Multiple backups for ignition, fuel systems, FADEC and other together with a quick and robust restart capability takes care of the remaining risks.
To my knowledge not a single Gripen has been lost due to engine failure, which proves that such measures are effective.
Will,
Be not confused, the Stuka was no multi-role fighter. The P-51 was a MULTI-ROLE tactical fighter and an outstanding long range multi-role Fighter at that -- a true force-multiplying tactical asset coming to the rescue when most needed.
There is NOTHING inherently wrong in principle with the concept of a modern, next-gen Multi-role-capable fighter either!
In fact, other than the F-15C, some older Mig-21, Mig-29, older Su-27 and the Mig-31 interceptor, perhaps every other modern existing A2A-capable fighter is Multi-role capable!
It's the reality of modern day technological advances which enables seemingly Air-combat optimized fighter designs to now be configured accordingly, as required, as perfectly capable A2G trucks too. The thing about not wanting a pound for air to ground no longer applies!
As for modular capabilities? Swapping out bolt-on targeting pods or nav pods, recon pods or ECM, etc, as required... of course. That's the flexibility which modern multi-role platforms with built-in avionics, EW management suite and open architecture deliver. Just certify the pilot and configure the jet sufficiently to fulfill the role it's capable of. Do you want some crews specialized in certain roles such as strike or SEAD or Air combat? Maybe, but that's changing the topic, right?
The problem though, very simply, is only with highly risky, unaffordable and unsustainable business-plan-marketed multi-role Fighter Program schemes which can be unloaded on a customer that is indeed requiring a multi-role platform!
Perhaps on that I think we might agree?
Some really good debate this thread; but I believe there is need for Australian defence planners to think more outside the square regarding the structure of the Air Force.
If, as it seems, Australia has arguably unwisely locked into Super Hornets, then perhaps 50 or so of that type would suffice for what might be termed the top end requirement. I agree with Will Leach that the potential of the Super Tucano for lower level operations seems unappreciated. Interestingly, Indonesia seems to be adopting that mixed approach.
So why not consider phased replacement of the F/A-18, Hawk and PC-9 trainer with Super Tucano, perhaps produced under licence in Australia? There would be substantial economies and the somewhat sacrosanct 2 strike and 4 'fighter' squadrons could be largely preserved, although with some change of emphasis in roles.
Regarding single-engine operations over the sea, it did not trouble most of us in my day; but digressing a tad. When the Army initially wanted an MLH capability, the operating level of the Air Force preferred the big Sikorsky CH-53/HH-53; but the Army pressed for the CH-47C Chinook, supported by 2 non-aviator members of the Air Board. The big Sikorsky would have allowed move into long-range combat SAR and enhanced Special Operations functions (including covert submarine support), if supported by KC-130 capability. Subsequently, the Army said they did not need the Chinook and it was shed by the RAAF, but Army later took back a few of them.
It has always seemed to me that Australian military planners do not really appreciate the importance of combat SAR capability nor the need to conduct efficient rescue operations within Australia's vast area of international responsibility. Recent shedding of versatile C-130H and intent to also phase out Blackhawk illustrate ignorance of the long-range SAR need, when some of both types could have been cost-effectively modified for this role.
If a large foreign force ands in Australia it is all over. We need to defend the air sea gap. How do we do that with super Tucanos?
Respectfully Anonymous; see some previous dialogue. Nobody in their right mind militarily would contemplate attacking/invading Australia as it would be an enormously burdensome proposition. And why would anyone bother when the borders cannot be adequately protected and the country is awash with illegal entrants, as acknowledged by the Federal Government? It would be just so easy for well-trained small groups to paralyse infrastructure to exert political influence. It is quite an unrealistic notion that the ADF could defeat armed attack on the continent; although, if appropriately equipped, DETERRENCE of interference with sea corridors should be achievable.
China already has an economic stranglehold on Australia and since early days of the nation, they have come to own and control major portions of Sydney City infrastructure and have never been backward re their demands of governments. Economic sanctions have over time proven much more effective than military endeavours in influencing some nations.
These are reasons why it is so important for there to be an objective update of national strategic assessment, before DWP2013 is cast. No value in generating such a document if it is based on unrealistic propositions and/or shaped around prior flawed defence capabilities planning. But I am not optimistic that such logic will be followed in Canberra.
Hello Another Peter,
You describe the Super Hornet as a "Super Dog". You mention that your opinion is based, at least in part, on a report by Coyle. Peter Coyle, who was the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, delivered his report to the US Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2000 – nearly 13 years ago.
I have read the report and Coyle's recommendations were all implemented in the Block II version of the Super Hornet purchased by the RAAF. Briefly:
* Stores carriage and release - "Currently, there are prohibitions on release of mixed
loads (i.e., air-to-air missiles next to air-to-ground weapons) because of time constraints for required flight testing to clear adjacent weapon release/launch positions. Removal of these constraints deserves high priority". - Done
* Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System and AIM-9X - Done
* Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) - Done
* Advanced Targeting FLIR (ATFLIR) - Done
* Positive Identification (PID) Capability - Done
* Decoupled Cockpits for the F model - Done
* Multi-Function Information Distribution System (MIDS) - Done
* Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) - Done
Coyle concluded that, "until these improved capabilities are provided, the F/A-18E/F cannot fully realize its potential and the operational capabilities for which it was envisioned".
Well, they have been provided.
The only problem I see with respect to Gripen NG being a realistic option is the apparent initial LRIP delivery date expected for around 2018.
RAAF would hence be back a square 1 if going that route, with requiring a stopgap.
I'm curious however if there's any consideration or evaluation of instead upgrading the Gripen-C with updated computer, display, EW management suite, and integrating something like an off-the-shelf SABR or RACR + integrating LM's new IRST pod under the centerline when required?
Could that be feasible as an affordable alternative or medium-term stopgap and be more reliably delivered by say 2016?
Just keep the twin wing tanks and write off the boosted range performance. RAAF would continue w/ very similar performance and delivery capability of their legacy Hornet, yet with reduced maintenance costs and modernized avionics/situational awareness. Perhaps a 12 yr Lease to hold over until 2030-2034 wherupon a more prudent 'next-gen' capability mix could be capitalized?
And in response to Bushranger, above; I will just agree to disagree with this reasoning that:
TACAIR recapitalization and national strategy requirements should be steered by a notion that... "Nobody in their right mind militarily would contemplate attacking/invading Australia as it would be an enormously burdensome proposition. And why would anyone bother when the borders cannot be adequately protected and the country is awash with illegal entrants..."
I just have to assess that criteria to be a flawed as a basis on which to base RAAF's TACAIR recapitalization requirement -- for at least over an unfortunately still uncertain medium-term period.
Hello NGF
Unfortunately Australia was ''already outmatched in the region'' on air combat. ''If you send out Super Hornets against the Sukhoi Su-35s, few if any of them will come back,'' according to Peter Goon (Horde), which was why I name the aircraft "Super Dog" because of a missing sting in its tail.
With all the features the F/A-18F has, such as:
* Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System and AIM-9X
* APG-79 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)
* Advanced Targeting FLIR (ATFLIR)
* Positive Identification (PID) Capability
* Decoupled Cockpits for the F model
* Multi-Function Information Distribution System (MIDS)
* Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM)
What about the extreme agility, acceleration, range and bigger weapons load? It has none of that, the Su-35S will easily run rings around the F/A-18F.
For more information about why is the Super Hornet inferior to the Sukhoi Flanker family
http://www.ausairpower.net/DT-SuperBug-vs-Flanker.html
On YouTube type in Simulation Showing F/A-18F vs Su-35S Pt 3 of 6
The simulation shows one of six scenarios over Taiwan between US Navy and China.
The engagement includes OTH Radar, UAV's, AWACS and tanker assets in addition to the F/A-18F Super Hornet and Su-35S Super Flanker-E
H3 MilSim presentation created by RepSim Pty of Australia.
See http://www.h3milsim.com for more information on the simulation used.
"How did the Super Hornets perform the engagement against the Su-35"?
Unfortunately, it was a disaster for the US Blue Forces which they were seriously decimated against the Red Forces. The results are shown below.
Status for USA
Losses:
- 2 AEW E-3F Sentry
- 24 F/A-18F
- 6 KC-10A Extender
Status for China
Losses:
- 1 Su-35S Super Flanker-E
So that was a very serious loss to the US Blue Forces in this particular engagement which shows why I'm concerned about Australia considers 24 more Super Hornets that is not able to do the job of dominating the skies.
Regards
Hello Another Peter,
My point is that some of your claims about Coyle's report on the the Super Hornet are 13 years out of date. And, according to Coyle himself, the Block II upgrades significantly improved the performance of the aircraft - that is why he recommended them.
You say that Russian aircraft will "run rings around" the Super Hornet. Coyle himself took a more rounded view:
"Maneuvering air combat in the transonic/supersonic portion of the flight envelope are not of high tactical relevancy since any maneuvering engagement rapidly migrates to the so-called "corner" of the flight envelopes (typically 0.6 Mach at 15,000 feet MSL). In this regard, the F/A-18E/F has little or no disadvantage. In fact, given that the unloaded subsonic acceleration performance of the F/A-18E/F is excellent, the higher bleed rates experienced by the F/A-18E/F may be considered an advantage since this facilitates reaching the corner speed faster
and translates to positive nose pointing in a dogfight. The principal consequence of this
limitation as it bears on survivability is the inability of F/A-18E/F to avoid or disengage
(“bugout”) from a close-in fight. In this regard, the F/A-18E/F is marginally inferior to the Lot
XIX C/D [Classic Hornet] and significantly inferior to the MiG-29. Many fighter aircrews and air warfare analysts believe that, with modern aircraft and missiles, the probability of a close-in fight
requiring a disengagement is small. Within this context, the reduced energy maneuverability of the F/A-18E/F is not viewed as a major detriment to its overall operational effectiveness. As the
F/A-18E/F incorporates planned improvements, specifically, the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing
System and the AIM-9X missile, these differences in energy-maneuverability will pose even less
concern to operational effectiveness in the air-to-air role".
To me, this reads like a balanced judgement when compared to your "Super Dog" comment.
It also goes to the debate about the turning ability of aircraft vs the turning ability of missiles plus HOBS targeting via the JHMCS. In other words, has the idea of the of the traditional dogfight become obsolete?
I am aware of the H3 MilSim presentation created by RepSim Pty of Australia and of Peter Goon's views. I am also aware they are contentious and not accepted by the RAAF or USN as an accurate representation of the Block II Super.
Having said that, I am not an unqualified fan of the Super Hornet. But I do ask that the capabilities of the Block II version should be presented fairly.
My view is that the FA-18F could an effective part of a well structured force. What would you think about combining the FA-18F's air-to-surface strike power and sensors with an aircraft with a stronger A2A profile eg Typhoon?
Regards.
That is why the most powerful navy in the world uses the super hornet, because its rubbish. Yeah right!
It uses it because it was the least worst option. And, considering the Navy has to pay for big grey floaty things. Something that the F-35 takes money away from, with no known return on investment.
NGF -
If you yourself are arguing that Super Hornet is not sufficient as an RAAF capability in the air-air role, to the extent that you'd advocate for a Euro Fighter acquisition over the F-35, then call it what it is...
OK, it's not a 'dog', but flat out insufficient in air-air. Fair?
If anything though, if staying the course with expanding reliance on the Super Hornet as the backbone of RAAF's future force structure, then the Super will likely need to offset her deficiencies with a more powerful extended range Air-air missile.
That would better ensure a first shot while at stand-off ranges and expand the bubble in which SH crews could decide to disengage and 'bug out'.
Re Repsim,what would you expect the RAAF to say?(apparently they have worked for the RAAF previously)And going on other dishonest testimony to the Joint Committee, that makes me believe Repsim.
The repsim "modelling" http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7Jy88g31W0 is farcical...
E.g. E3's and tankers just holding in Caps whilst all the fighters are shot down. Consequently get shot down themselves..
E.g. Superhornets spread over a ~double the frontage of the flankers (1/2 hiding behind taiwan waiting to be fed into the battle piecemeal). no surprises with a superior concentration of firepower what happens here...
E.g. No tactical formations.. No flexibilty... no actual tactics...
To top it off assumptions made of aircraft systems derived from unclass sources and "best guesses".
Accurate.. yeah right!
The term 'dog' is used in flight test to mean "degraded operational gradients".
The Super Hornet design has resulted in significantly degraded operational gradients, thus the term 'super dog'.
Now, where does the JSF fit into this picture?
Why do those who obviously don't have a clue choose to post anonymously?
Yeh, it's a rhetorical question but speaks volumes.
Is Horde your real name?
Tell us then Horde, how realistic an operational scenario you see the repsim modelling given the following limited questions ...
Why the Fighters were arrayed against each other in frontage only? I.e. where was the defence in depth?
Why the SU35 were aligned more to the north than the SH's, giving them what looked to me a localised numerical superiority?
Why didnt we see any L&L?
Why didnt the AWAC's leave their orbits at suitable defensive ranges?
Why the tankers didn't leave the towline when there were no fighters to refuel but stayed to be shotdown?
How many SU35's does china operate?
When is Chris Mills going to write his next techno-thriller (I do like them)?
Anon 3:58
I totally get what your saying. The model in question really didnt take human factors like strategy and tactics into question, but I dont think that was the point of medel, and thats a limiiting factor of that methodology. Large scale realitic video games might be better if the programmers have good inputs and are unbiased about things. Bias is a potential risk in anything like this, but im not aware of one side in the scenario being any more creative than the the other side.
These types of modeling csn be useful in evaluating hardware, but how helpful Im not sure. My biggest problem wiith this kind of thing is that its very easy to start thinking just in terms of hardware, unless of course thats inconvienient of ones biases. The interesting thing to me is that many Super Hornet and JSF fans seem to be talking of reliance on tactics, training, srrategy, and even pilots all of a sudden. Nevermind that those sides of the discourse have long dismissed those kinds of arguments, being all about hardware centric plane vs plane analysis.
The Hornet family does seem to have the operating cost and sortie rate,, especially in terms of carriers ops, for people to argue for them in terms of training and operational art, but it really doesnt have the performance envelope to really allow tactical flexibility imo. The JSF is experiencing an even more dramatic shift in arguments for, now that performance promises can no longer be made with a straight face. Both planes defenders still revert to the hardware only mindset when pressed though, just in terms of this, that, or these gadgets, regardless of overall performance deficits. Not surprising, as these planes have always had a reductionist air to them, with the only big picture ever trotted out being the old revolution in military affairs fantasy, although that emporer has new clothes as of late.
A great example of this is that when one points to these planes limitations as a shortcoming in terms of getting into, out of, surving or winning in dog fights, its all about how it doesnt matter because itll all be guarenteed kill BVR combat. Get past this defense mechanism and then all of a sudden these planes are suddenly ideal dog fighters. They will win because they are slow and cant turn, and thats a good thing! Dont get me wrong, the kind of planes JSF opponents would prefer can dump energy, especially when they want to, but they can gain it back. While an EM inspired fighter can pump and dump, these turkeys can just dump. But hey, look at this gadget again, it makes staying in one place (air combat wise) and being a sitting duck an advantage!
Never mind that less gadget laden plane would be more manuverable, allowing for more tactical options, as well as the operational advantage of being able to engage and disengage more easily, picking ones fights. Never mind that a somewhat simpler plane would could still have HOBS capability. Never mind that plane that could be cheaper to own and operate could allow for more planes and thus more strategic depth or swarm tactics. And whatever yku do, dont you mind that a more affordable plane could allow for money to go into the training of pilots and the development of tactics. Human factors dont matter right, just hardware. Except when that hardware falls short. Shocker.
I was given the nickname of 'Horde' being short for Yellow Horde at Pt Cook from my OTS Classmates. As I was being kitted out in the Para Loft at PAX River for flying gear, the Head Rigger proudly presented me with name tags complete with a set of US Navy FTE wings and the call sign "Horde" - someone back Home, it seems, had sent a message to TPS which ensured I was not going to be allowed to be an unknown quantity in my first week at PAX! Horde was my call sign throughout my military flying career and remains so to the present day.
Am more than happy to answer questions from real people with real interests in intellectually stimulating discussion and critical debate to determine the truth of what is real.
Internet trolls demonstrating little if any integrity, professional ethics or capacity for rational thought who continue to hide behind anonymity fall well short and thus fail to meet these criteria - almost as much as the JSF designs fail to meet the JORD specifications. So, internet trolls need not apply.
Horde.
As a civilian who has never served, yet for some reason thinks that civilian interest in military affairs should exten beyond ribbons, catchphrases, and facebook post of silohetted soldiers against a flag and eagle head backdrop, I admit I dont always (or ever) know what Im talking about.
What I do know is that "Horde" is a freaking BA call sign.
@ Will Leach - Thanks, I think (Hee! Hee!) though not my choice, but rather that of my peers at the time including 'Black Man', a mountain of a fellow of White Russian descent with a permanent 5 o'clock shadow and 'Slug' which I will leave to other's imagination and a couple of ex-Troops who went simply by the names of 'Doc' and 'Haines'.
As for BVR, IMHO, this type of engagement is more challenging than WVR due to what is known as the BVR Paradox.
Put simply, this is because in BVR Engagements, one is dealing with much larger volumes of air where speed, agility and persistence along with being able to use this volume to effect, including the upper reaches (altitude) rule; one must rely upon remote sensing to know when and at who to shoot; and, there is that little thing known as the tyranny of time and space.
And for those who reckon a missile that can pull 50+ g @ really high Mach, especially after having turned thru large angles will always overmatch a modern day, agile fighter, really have no understanding, let alone appreciation, of even the basic physics of kinematics.
Mind you, these are also the same people who claim manoeuvres like J turns, the Cobra and those like the ones that attributes such as relaxed static directional stability provide are only for air shows!
Hello Peter Goon (Horde)
Is it possible to change your callsign from "Horde" to something else. I have no idea whoever out there applied "Horde".
Some folks on this article were considering the SAAB JAS-39E/F Gripen NG as a F/A-18A/B Hornet replacement, in your opinion Pete is it the best aircraft to fulfill the RAAF requirements? As you know you've probably seen my point of view (posted above) that I'm concerned about the Gripen NG's suitability.
Have you or Dr Carlo Kopp published the information about the SAAB Gripen's characteristics etc on your website? So the readers out there can understand the Gripen's survivability in combat etc and its limitations.
Hope to hear from you. BTW I really find your APA website with great information, far better than the wacky Australian Aviation and some other defence websites that spread untruthful rumours that don't understand why the JSF designs fail to meet the JORD specifications etc.
Regards
Some wisdom from retired General Peter Leahy, former Chief of Army Australia, as reported in 'The Australian' 4Feb13.
Now director of Canberra University's National Security Institute, Professor Leahy...has said Australia was much more likely to be sending troops on peacekeeping missions than fighting a major enemy nation.
He said the new national security strategy signalled an unhealthy focus on the most unlikely threat - an attack on Australia by another nation.
"And, yes, the ghosts of the 2009 white paper are not yet dead. They are thinking of China," he said.
To another Peter:
One interesting aspect of this hypothetical proposition for a Gripen 'NG' option, would be in the Gripen-NG's use of existing RAAF Super Hornet F414 logistics and support.
They should be able to relatively seamlessly enter the Force structure starting by the end of the decade without the need for major logistical overhaul and investments. MILCON requirements could be reduced significantly as well.
RAAF would probably still need some degree of further SLEP and expensive systems upgrade for at least a couple squadrons of Hornets to hold over until the Final hypothetical NG deliveries became operational (sometime around 2023-2024?). But that is already likely budgeted in and accounted for, given the stay-the-course F-35 acquisition plan in place (forcing the unplanned Hornet SLEP and upgrade stopgaps to come), right?
One could conceive of another 24 or so F-18EF block II+ units as contingency in the near-term to fill the gap in keeping with the current delayed track.
Perhaps a force of something like 40-50x 'Sea' Gripen NG (?) could thus augment the Supers, along with some Super Tucano and/or unmanned drones for maritime patrol for a total of say, 100-115 operational tactical airframes (manned/unmanned) by 2025-2027)?
Note I'm kicking around an actual option for the 'Sea-Gripen' NG in this case, with the added prospect of enabling potential future joint-operation with USN, UK, PLAN(?) and other friendly Carriers as a force-multiplying and capability bonus!
Either way, a flight of Gripen NG armed with next-gen stand-off strike munitions, or next-gen BVR A2A munitions, supported by F-18F+ in escort-jamming role (and buddy tanking), might just suffice as a 'good enough' mix of next-gen capabilities for RAAF.
Horde, that was a comoliment. I think.
The thinh that never made sense to me about BVR missles is that I always thought there high speed and low to no wing surface would allow them far less chamce of changing thier direction and speed when conpared to a fighter. Is this right? Either way, Ive never seen the BVR paradox explicitly stated. Thank you, it makes a lot of sense.
On the other hand, I always thought moves like the Cobra would be useful, maybe not as a standard tactic but as a fast transient to change the dynamics of a fight. Plus, with HOBS missles in WVR wouldnt being able to swing the nose around like that make a dangerous plane even more so? If you or anyone else wouldnt mind explaining this in more depth I would really appreciate it. The airshow only caveat just never added up. Funny, because the Raptor loves showing it the cobra at air shows, even if its done less impressively.
I would fully concur with Bushranger in that a new national strategy with a focus on a future attack on Australia -- perhaps implying to some extent PRC as being singled out -- is unhealthy... just as any hypothetical PRC 'strategy', or US's for that matter signaling out another, as guidance to steer ones military build-up (or strategic shift), is not healthy as well.
But regardless of the validity of that view however, is the separate issue of how to most prudently, cost-effectively and reliably recapitalize RAAF's legacy Tactical aviation force structure (retired F-111 and soon-to-be Hornets) in a pathway to best maintain modern capabilities and deterrence over the next-generation.
Not as part of a National strategy focus to contain any one 'threat' nation in particular, but merely as part of a natural recapitalization strategy to maintain deterrence and a flexible mix of capabilities -- in the most cost-effective and prudent fashion -- into the next-generation.
This strategy of course, should not be disjointed or mutually exclusive from any simultaneous robust foreign policy objective and goal to support: the evolution and development of civil, regional and global demilitarization, stability, cooperation and modernization, etc.
That should be the enhanced and robust joint-plan to foster and encourage 'multi-laterally'; in the new era here on spaceship Earth.
The time is of the essence and make no mistake there should be no delays on that necessary mutual-strategy!
Hello Anonymous
Are you still around.
I’ve just did some brainstorming here. According to Eric a true requirement would show that if we need 124 or 148 aircraft, here is another proposal I've made below.
76SQN – A-10C Thunderbolt or Super Tucano with hefty 30mm cannon for CAS duties (Close Air Support)
3SQN – Eurofighter Typhoon or Dassault Rafale
77SQN – F-15AU Strike Eagle
2OCU, 75SQN – F-15AU Strike Eagle
What do you reckon about this idea?
For example if you look at Saudi Arabia's Air Force, they are equipped with mixed fleet with Eurofighter Typhoon, F-15C/D Eagles and F-15S Strike Eagles.
Soon to be equipped with 84 F-15SA models and upgrading their current fleet of 70 F-15S aircraft to the SA configuration.
Regards
Your Feb2 8:23PM bit a great post Will Leach.
To Anonymous Feb4 3:19PM.
For the past decade or so, defence capabilities planning oriented toward long-range future capabilities has caused Australia's defence capacity to diminish overall whereas there should have been primary emphasis on optimising platforms in service, where cost-effective, to maintain adequate continual and credible military preparedness. As history has proven, nations have mostly had to fight with what they had in service when conflicts have arisen with pretty short notice.
Arguably, there has been huge waste of tens of billions of dollars on acquisition of inappropriate platforms for all 3 armed forces considering the futuristic Force 2030 vision foolish, as some in the commentariat are now concluding. So, the opportunity was lost to maintain the Air Force at about same size, as the nation is now faced with a long period of financial austerity.
There will need to be some rationalisation of assets and it seems to me highly unlikely that the existing force structure of 2 strike and 4 fighter squadrons can prevail for cost reasons.
If there is a justifiable argument for a top end air superiority capability (and I am not convinced), then affordability becomes the main issue and it is hard to see 70 or so F/A-18 being replaced for that role and close air support.
24 Super Hornets replaced 24 F-111 and will presumably have to suffice for maritime strike deterrence, although it would be better to trade them back for F-15s. But all of the contractual bits that DMO cooks up would probably mitigate against that proposition.
Your thoughts re a better mix of platforms are logical and the RAAF would be wise if they seized the initiative in that regard instead or religiously adhering to the notion of replacing the whole of the Hornet fleet with about the same numbers of high end performance machines. The Super Tucano would be just great for any regional close air support needs, better than the Hawk in my view, and there are obvious economies in going down that track.
Just how many platforms are desirable and justifiable to replace the F/A-18s is really the question, to provide a viable air superiority capability, if needed at all.
Errata. I should have said 2 strike and 5 fighter squadrons, including 79SQN in WA.
Make no mistake, the RAAF force structure is 4 fighter/strike squadrons which share all roles and 4 training/conversion squadrons. This is soon changing to 4 fighter/strike squadrons, 1 EA squadron and 3 training/conversion squadrons.
The Hawk is most definitely a trainer only with no wartime capability in either the airframe and personnel/logistics structure.
Peter, look at the above force structure and now imagine trying to train aircrew for 3 very different platforms and roles spread over 4 operational squadrons. The problem would be unworkable. One of the many reasons that the Super Hornet is the interim fighter and not the F-15E.
Well, it is certainly a reason that a status quo force-structure makes the F-35 completely unaffordable as there is no way to float that many mistake-jets in current annual ops budgets at twice the cost per flying hour of a Super Hornet.
Hi Flasheart; I live just near my old fighter base and Hawks are frequently on the air to ground range. The close air support capability was used in argument to acquire the type and they are also used on occasions in WA for fleet support roles. I am a 76SQN Association member and the unit level thinking is they have combat capability.
Justification for the Hawk as an intermediate trainer was slim in my view. In days gone, the Vampire was used for applied flying training and also for initial weapons training at fighter OCU. Similarly for Macchi in later years.
But I really do not see continued need for an intermediate jet trainer requiring new pilots to transition from PC-9 to Hawk to F/A-18. In the non-military flying world, pilots mostly transition from piston/turbo to pure jet flying without difficulty with much of the conversion training of course being synthetic. Replacing both PC-9 and Hawk with Super Tucano would yield substantial cost savings and also provide an improved remote airfield capability for regional close air support operations.
The ADF just has to get smarter about how they do things to stay within affordable defence budgeting.
BR71 - not sure who in the "unit level thinking" you are talking about though I think if you did a poll that most hawk instructors would be under no illusion as to the combat capability of the hawk.
Lets have a look in the real world.
No RWR
No Internal gun (low velocity podded 30mm cannon)
No datalink
No radar
No BVR weapon
No precision weapons
No EO/IR pod
No countermeasures
the list can go on...
It is quite clearly a training capability and that is what it is used for...
The CAS capability is (and will only ever be) used in training (for baby fighter pilots, and for JTAC's to get some live controls in). Likewise with the fleet support capability.
The reason you see hawks beating the pattern at the range is so that the baby fighter pilots can develop the sight handling skills that will be applicable in the future on combat aircraft (read Hornet/SH).
However what it does (Intermediate Fighter Course) it does well, providing speed, wingloading, avionics, weights, loadouts etc that the turboprop aircraft at the time did not have. The turboprops (PC21/Super Tucano etc) can get some of those capabilities but not all.
You may well see the RAAF doing something like training straight from PC21/Super Tucano to Hornet; the Swiss are doing it now. Yet at the moment and in the past with PC9 being the primary trainer the step from PC9 to Hornet was too great. Hence the status quo.
Anon, can you elaborate why Hawks couldnt be used in at east some CAS combat situations? Do you think this is true of all jet trainers?
Sorry that should be introductory Fighter course...
To Another Peter and Anonymous,
Remember that the F/A-18F two seat version of the Block II was selected to replace the F-111.
The F-111 was a strike platform not an A2A platform. In my opinion, while the F/A-18F has a much greater A2A capability than the F-111, it should also be viewed as primarily a strike platform. In that role the Block II F is far from a "dog". The US Navy also wants an aircraft that is primarily a strike platform. That's why it has both two seat F and single seat E models.
On the issue of force structure; I have always been sceptical about the RAAF seeking a single aircraft type to replace the Classic Hornets and the F-111's. (It has never relied on a single type in the past.) There are two broad reasons: 1. It is difficult to find a single aircraft that can effectively perform all the air combat tasks required of the RAAF - air dominance, close air support, SEAD, anti-shipping strike etc. 2. A single platform allows an enemy to develop one suite of counter measures and tactics in response. Of course two aircraft types impose additional logistical and maintenance burdens, but that has to come second to operational needs.
So, I would replace the RAAF's 71 Classic Hornets through a rigorous tender process with an aircraft that is currently fully operational and which has room for development (eg Typhoon). Purchase about 60. In the selection criteria have A2A as the first priority with air-to-surface as a highly desirable second priority.
I would retain the F/A-18F. Indeed, in my view a 24 aircraft fleet is not sufficient for sustained operations. I would therefore expand the fleet to 48 to provide two front line squadrons, a small Growler capability plus a training squadron and reserve aircraft for maintenance and attrition.
In the medium term this would give the RAAF 48 Supers (including a small number of Growlers) providing a primary strike and secondary A2A capability plus 60 new war-ready fighters providing a primary A2A and secondary strike capability.
Around 2020 I would again test the market via a rigorous tender process to seek a replacement for the F/A-18F. Who knows, maybe the JSF will be finished by then!
Horde, I take your point that “dog” could mean "degraded operational gradients", but I doubt Another Peter meant it in that way.
Regards
If the RAAF only has 2 f35's by 2020, doesn't that make a third super hornet tranche inevitable?
Hi NGF
The reason why the F/A-18F is nicknamed the "Super Dog" is because the aircraft has a missing sting in its tail, and the fact that “dog” is a fighter which does not perform.
The F/A-18F is not greater in A2A capability than the F-111 etc etc.
http://www.ausairpower.net/pig.html
Why Australia Should Retain Its F-111 Fleet.
Regards
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