After the Iroquois UH-1H 'Bushranger' gunship project had evolved over 11 months of in-country development in Vietnam, we began about 2 months of aircrew work-up training with the prototype aircraft while others were being modified.
We would conduct this training in areas allocated by HQ 1ATF where ordnance expenditure might have some worthwhile effects. At that time, Vung Tau airfield had been receiving reasonably frequent rocket attacks from nearby Long Son Island and the US Advisor at that location requested 1ATF assistance.
At the end of training in other areas of the TAOR, we would refuel/rearm and proceed back to our base at Vung Tau via Long Son Island, uplift the Special Forces Advisor and then engage jungle locations according to his local intelligence.
Soon after a few such sorties, the Advisor got intelligence that a few VC had been killed and wounded with some surrendering. One evening when we landed to pick up our US friend, he fronted with a very big grin informing us that the enemy on the island had all surrendered because the Bushrangers were making them nervous wrecks, albeit we were then not even operational! He was elated and promised to buy us all dinner, when he could get some leave.
A few weeks later, after being declared operational, 3 Bushrangers were tasked to assist Vietnamese forces when the enemy had entered and occupied Dat Do, a large provincial town in the province. We were making very low passes engaging the opposition located beneath an elevated school building in the centre of town and trying not to cause too much damage to the school. A 12.7mm weapon began engaging us from the periphery of the town about 1 kilometre distant manned by 3 uniformed enemy and located in a narrow gap between houses. We requested clearance to engage from our Advisor friend from Long Son Island whom we recognised by his radio callsign, 'Multi Affair 18'. He began replying but then no further voice although his radio was still being keyed for a short time. Our rules of engagement required radio contact with ground elements and having no comms, we reluctantly withdrew from the scene.
Our Army GLO later advised us that when 1ATF cavalry elements had subsequently entered the town, they discovered around 30 enemy laying around our initial target area under the school (the HQ 1ATF records differ). They also apparently found our US Special Forces friend. He had been badly wounded and seized by the enemy who cut his throat. He was a very fine soldier.
The message here is that if helo gunships have lots of ammunition and can lay down sustained high density fire, any enemy is unlikely to have the stomach to continue an engagement, assuming they have managed to survive. If enhanced Bushrangers had been employed in Afghanistan, they might have ended some long duration engagements pretty quick, and cost-effectively.
UH-1 modifications to afghanistan?!? Well the soviets deployed the far more capable Mi-8 and Mi-24 witch can can lay down a lot more sustained high density fire we all know how that conflict ended. BTW how would a UH-1 stand a MANPADS hit compared to a Hind or Apache for example.
Apart from manpads,in Vietnam at the end of America's involvement, the Cobras got hammered when they crossed the borders of South Vietnam. Radar directed 37mm and .50cal.
So MANPADS can knock down everything? They have not really dominated any battlefield thus far and where present, then simply adjust operating practices to the nature of the threat to minimize losses.
Many believed that large fixed wing gunships would not survive, yet they excelled during the Vietnam era although a few were lost over the past 40 plus years in various campaigns. But they are now being further enhanced and their use is expanding.
271 Hueycobras were lost during Vietnam involvement and especially when they were up against more sophisticated air defence structures.
If you are going to provide the best possible intimate close air support for the guys on the ground, then you need platforms with multiple cannon/gun weaponry redundancy and bags of ammunition, to stay in the fight as long as possible. Most of the hugely expensive AAH species do not provide that capability ergo the merit of lower cost platforms like a Huey II Bushranger ($2million)or even the Blackhawk UH-60L DAP. Carting sophisticated expensive missilery and unguided rockets about which cannot be safely used in very close support makes no sense for that role.
Omitted mention of the UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey) which the USMC also operates in a gunship role in Afghanistan. Probably about the same unit cost as a Blackhawk UH-60L, around $20million.
Bushranger, the 37mm and .50 cal radar directed AA changed the scene forever.The Cobras were decimated,as you know. "Bay" Adams also advised that he saw the changes coming.The Helicopter is limited,depending on the threats.He told my father after the the Vietnam war ended.
"The message is that if gunships have lots of ammo and can lay down sustained high density fire and there is no manpads threat.''
Well, as you all probably know during the 80ties in Afgnanistan the soviets used the Mi-8 and mi-24 modifications, witch are superior compared to the Cobra and Huey, however after the Stinger showed up the game changed . Good thing for US/NATOforces in Afghanistan, that they have the luxury to fight agains insurgents who do not have systems like SA-18,SA-24 , or newer chinese systems
Hi Anonymous. Then Group Captain 'Bay' Adams flew with me a bit in Vietnam as Task Force Air Commander and we would often debate presumed helicopter vulnerability until well after bar closing, based of course on his WW2 experiences against German flak gunners. At another lunching of eagles yesterday, this aspect was a topic of informal chat with former Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal 'Jake' Newham, a Korean War veteran.
'Bay' used to sometimes bring the Commander 1ATF down to Vung Tau for an overnight stay and the junior pilots usually assailed him in the bar telling him how the war should be run, which he seemed to much enjoy.
Post-Vietnam, 'Bay' was behind initiatives to develop helo versus fighter tactics, night operations techniques and enhanced field deployment capabilities. Both 5 and 9 Squadrons were involved in the tactics development fun at Williamtown and Woomera; both Peter Ring (CO 5) and myself (CO 9), formerly fighter pilots, participated then and at the luncheon yesterday. My kids developed the RAAF Iroquois camouflage scheme for that very purpose and it was eventually adopted for the whole fleet. The quite successful tactics development lessons were unfortunately forfeited upon Army takeover of battlefield helicopters.
Both 'Bay' and 'Jake' were highly respected leaders.
You can download from the web the very interesting 271 page US Army Vietnam Studies, Air Mobility Vietnam 1961-1971 by LTGEN John J. Tolson. Pages 234 to 253 cover the Operation LAMSON 719 Laos intervention mentioning that the NVA had 19 anti-aircraft battalions deployed in southern Laos.
The employment of any air assets must of course always be balanced against mission priority and the nature of threats. War-fighting cannot be successfully conducted without some risk of losses.
"If you are going to provide the best possible intimate close air support for the guys on the ground, then you need platforms with multiple cannon/gun weaponry redundancy and bags of ammunition, to stay in the fight as long as possible."
Flying gun wagon you say, well in this category the best are , again Mi-24 and Mi-8. For example A legacy Mi-8M can carry : 4 - 7,62mm PK machine guns inside ( one froward firing, one rear and two on the sides) 6- external harpoints on witch you can mount: 2- GUV-8700 machine gun/grenade launcher pods; 2- UPK-23-2 , 23mm gun pods; 2- S-8-20 rocket pods;
And yet when the stingers start to play along , the choppers have to stay at a longer distance from the troops they are supporting.
Anyway, has ever anyone wondered that it would be actually cheaper for Australia if they had bougth a few dozen second hand mix of Mi-24,Mi-17 do a little upgrade on them use them during the whole campain and after that leave them to the afghans.
"$70 million a pop, huh?" What do you mean is that the single unit price of a Tiger helicopter?
''They have not really dominated any battlefield thus far and where present, then simply adjust operating practices to the nature of the threat to minimize losses."
Yes they have, in the 80ties the Stingers forced the soviet tactical fixed and rotary wing combat aircraft to fly higher and CAS for troops on the ground was often ineffective . So they played a major role.
Hello Mi-17, am pleased that you raised some points.
Based on information provided to me by Bell Helicopter, an Iroquois UH-1H enhanced to Huey II standard can hover fully laden at 10,500 pounds AUW in ground effect at around 12,000 feet AMSL.
Adapting that platform to the RAAF -designed Bushranger configuration, fully fuelled and with a 4 man crew it could carry:
2 x low recoil 20mm cannon pods with 500 rounds total of HE ammunition,
2 x fixed forward firing 7.62mm miniguns with 9,000 rounds of ammo,
4 x 7.62mm machine guns operated as twin doorguns either side with 3,000 rounds total ammunition.
With that payload, there would still be 600 pounds plus weight availability for EOTS or FLIR and other niceties like defensive suites and some lightweight armour around the engine and transmission.
The 7.62mm miniguns were absolutely essential in Vietnam to provide very close accurate high density fire as close as 10 metres from friendlies in jungle engagements.
The NC621 low recoil cannon pods are in common worldwide use and easily fitted to the Bushranger in lieu of the 2 x 7 round rocket launchers with 17 pound warheads. The safety distance for unguided rockets was about 150 metres in my day whereas HE cannon around 35 metres; so, 500 rounds of 20mm potentially much more useful and damaging than 14 x 17 pound warhead rockets. We did use Flechette rounds also which certainly cannot be safely delivered near friendlies.
The Huey II Bushranger could be fully fuelled and rearmed in 15 minutes with aircrew also assisting the armourers. Cruise speed about 100 knots, which matters nought in the target area, and fuel endurance 168 minutes with nil reserves.
The Huey II is of course very low cost at around $2million and very cost-effective to operate. The Mi-24 and Mi-17 are comparatively large platforms and I have not researched unit costs and economics.
In earlier years in exercise MANPAD scenarios, we found it safer to operate at low level making it much more difficult for the operators to get a missile lock-on. Missile technology would have course since improved.
Re Tiger. Public info says the French can only carry about 220 rounds of 30mm in Afganistan and less than a full load of rockets when based at around 6,000 feet AMSL, with fuel loading unknown.
In the Australian configuration, Tiger has no gun/cannon redundancy and the single high recoil weapon fitted apparently has a cooling cycle limitation for sustained firing. It will ultimately really hammer the somewhat understrength airframe.
If I were tasked to try and make the bloody things better suited for possible Australian military roles, I would shed the rockets and substitute 7.62mm minigun pods from Macchi, which might still be in storage. Alternatively, podded .50 inch weapons are available. Multiple weapon redundancy and accurate high volume fire is absolutely essential for close quarters support of ground forces.
Regarding MANPAD battlefield 'domination'. It is always a command prerogative what level of risk in combat is acceptable, although some losses are inevitable. If anybody is reluctant to provide a capability due to risk, then you immediately afford the opposition a big psychological advantage.
And the State Department operates refurbished S61's.The british operated their Sea Kings with new rotors etc. The Australian Navy could not wait to get rid of their Sea Kings.
22 comments:
Eric,should we list the whole number of projects that have failed under the "expert" mangement of DMO?
Perhaps Bonza/AD can help us?
$70 million a pop, huh?
My calculations show $91 millino each.
Interesting, given the production delays, development problems and price of the motor.
A lot of money to shoot up a few mud huts and at people carrying muskets.
Hi Perplexed,
The Projects of Concern list is starting point:
http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/11/19/minister-for-defence-materiel-projects-of-concern-summit/
But you have to be skeptical about the use of the word "Remediated".
A short story of relevance.
After the Iroquois UH-1H 'Bushranger' gunship project had evolved over 11 months of in-country development in Vietnam, we began about 2 months of aircrew work-up training with the prototype aircraft while others were being modified.
We would conduct this training in areas allocated by HQ 1ATF where ordnance expenditure might have some worthwhile effects. At that time, Vung Tau airfield had been receiving reasonably frequent rocket attacks from nearby Long Son Island and the US Advisor at that location requested 1ATF assistance.
At the end of training in other areas of the TAOR, we would refuel/rearm and proceed back to our base at Vung Tau via Long Son Island, uplift the Special Forces Advisor and then engage jungle locations according to his local intelligence.
Soon after a few such sorties, the Advisor got intelligence that a few VC had been killed and wounded with some surrendering. One evening when we landed to pick up our US friend, he fronted with a very big grin informing us that the enemy on the island had all surrendered because the Bushrangers were making them nervous wrecks, albeit we were then not even operational! He was elated and promised to buy us all dinner, when he could get some leave.
A few weeks later, after being declared operational, 3 Bushrangers were tasked to assist Vietnamese forces when the enemy had entered and occupied Dat Do, a large provincial town in the province. We were making very low passes engaging the opposition located beneath an elevated school building in the centre of town and trying not to cause too much damage to the school. A 12.7mm weapon began engaging us from the periphery of the town about 1 kilometre distant manned by 3 uniformed enemy and located in a narrow gap between houses. We requested clearance to engage from our Advisor friend from Long Son Island whom we recognised by his radio callsign, 'Multi Affair 18'. He began replying but then no further voice although his radio was still being keyed for a short time. Our rules of engagement required radio contact with ground elements and having no comms, we reluctantly withdrew from the scene.
Our Army GLO later advised us that when 1ATF cavalry elements had subsequently entered the town, they discovered around 30 enemy laying around our initial target area under the school (the HQ 1ATF records differ). They also apparently found our US Special Forces friend. He had been badly wounded and seized by the enemy who cut his throat. He was a very fine soldier.
The message here is that if helo gunships have lots of ammunition and can lay down sustained high density fire, any enemy is unlikely to have the stomach to continue an engagement, assuming they have managed to survive. If enhanced Bushrangers had been employed in Afghanistan, they might have ended some long duration engagements pretty quick, and cost-effectively.
UH-1 modifications to afghanistan?!? Well the soviets deployed the far more capable Mi-8 and Mi-24 witch can can lay down a lot more sustained high density fire we all know how that conflict ended. BTW how would a UH-1 stand a MANPADS hit compared to a Hind or Apache for example.
Mi17
Same result,bang.Goodbye.
The message is that if gunships have lots of ammo and can lay down sustained high density fire and there is no manpads threat....
Apart from manpads,in Vietnam at the end of America's involvement, the Cobras got hammered when they crossed the borders of South Vietnam.
Radar directed 37mm and .50cal.
So MANPADS can knock down everything? They have not really dominated any battlefield thus far and where present, then simply adjust operating practices to the nature of the threat to minimize losses.
Many believed that large fixed wing gunships would not survive, yet they excelled during the Vietnam era although a few were lost over the past 40 plus years in various campaigns. But they are now being further enhanced and their use is expanding.
271 Hueycobras were lost during Vietnam involvement and especially when they were up against more sophisticated air defence structures.
If you are going to provide the best possible intimate close air support for the guys on the ground, then you need platforms with multiple cannon/gun weaponry redundancy and bags of ammunition, to stay in the fight as long as possible. Most of the hugely expensive AAH species do not provide that capability ergo the merit of lower cost platforms like a Huey II Bushranger ($2million)or even the Blackhawk UH-60L DAP. Carting sophisticated expensive missilery and unguided rockets about which cannot be safely used in very close support makes no sense for that role.
Omitted mention of the UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey) which the USMC also operates in a gunship role in Afghanistan. Probably about the same unit cost as a Blackhawk UH-60L, around $20million.
Bushranger, the 37mm and .50 cal radar directed AA changed the scene forever.The Cobras were decimated,as you know.
"Bay" Adams also advised that he saw the changes coming.The Helicopter is limited,depending on the threats.He told my father after the the Vietnam war ended.
Ok in Afghanistan I am sure.
"The message is that if gunships have lots of ammo and can lay down sustained high density fire and there is no manpads threat.''
Well, as you all probably know during the 80ties in Afgnanistan the soviets used the Mi-8 and mi-24 modifications, witch are superior compared to the Cobra and Huey, however after the Stinger showed up the game changed .
Good thing for US/NATOforces in Afghanistan, that they have the luxury to fight agains insurgents who do not have systems like SA-18,SA-24 , or newer chinese systems
Hi Anonymous. Then Group Captain 'Bay' Adams flew with me a bit in Vietnam as Task Force Air Commander and we would often debate presumed helicopter vulnerability until well after bar closing, based of course on his WW2 experiences against German flak gunners. At another lunching of eagles yesterday, this aspect was a topic of informal chat with former Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal 'Jake' Newham, a Korean War veteran.
'Bay' used to sometimes bring the Commander 1ATF down to Vung Tau for an overnight stay and the junior pilots usually assailed him in the bar telling him how the war should be run, which he seemed to much enjoy.
Post-Vietnam, 'Bay' was behind initiatives to develop helo versus fighter tactics, night operations techniques and enhanced field deployment capabilities. Both 5 and 9 Squadrons were involved in the tactics development fun at Williamtown and Woomera; both Peter Ring (CO 5) and myself (CO 9), formerly fighter pilots, participated then and at the luncheon yesterday. My kids developed the RAAF Iroquois camouflage scheme for that very purpose and it was eventually adopted for the whole fleet. The quite successful tactics development lessons were unfortunately forfeited upon Army takeover of battlefield helicopters.
Both 'Bay' and 'Jake' were highly respected leaders.
You can download from the web the very interesting 271 page US Army Vietnam Studies, Air Mobility Vietnam 1961-1971 by LTGEN John J. Tolson. Pages 234 to 253 cover the Operation LAMSON 719 Laos intervention mentioning that the NVA had 19 anti-aircraft battalions deployed in southern Laos.
The employment of any air assets must of course always be balanced against mission priority and the nature of threats. War-fighting cannot be successfully conducted without some risk of losses.
"If you are going to provide the best possible intimate close air support for the guys on the ground, then you need platforms with multiple cannon/gun weaponry redundancy and bags of ammunition, to stay in the fight as long as possible."
Flying gun wagon you say, well in this category the best are , again Mi-24 and Mi-8. For example A legacy Mi-8M can carry :
4 - 7,62mm PK machine guns inside ( one froward firing, one rear and two on the sides)
6- external harpoints on witch you can mount:
2- GUV-8700 machine gun/grenade launcher pods;
2- UPK-23-2 , 23mm gun pods;
2- S-8-20 rocket pods;
And yet when the stingers start to play along , the choppers have to stay at a longer distance from the troops they are supporting.
Anyway, has ever anyone wondered that it would be actually cheaper for Australia if they had bougth a few dozen second hand mix of Mi-24,Mi-17 do a little upgrade on them use them during the whole campain and after that leave them to the afghans.
"$70 million a pop, huh?"
What do you mean is that the single unit price of a Tiger helicopter?
''They have not really dominated any battlefield thus far and where present, then simply adjust operating practices to the nature of the threat to minimize losses."
Yes they have, in the 80ties the Stingers forced the soviet tactical fixed and rotary wing combat aircraft to fly higher and CAS for troops on the ground was often ineffective . So they played a major role.
Hello Mi-17, am pleased that you raised some points.
Based on information provided to me by Bell Helicopter, an Iroquois UH-1H enhanced to Huey II standard can hover fully laden at 10,500 pounds AUW in ground effect at around 12,000 feet AMSL.
Adapting that platform to the RAAF -designed Bushranger configuration, fully fuelled and with a 4 man crew it could carry:
2 x low recoil 20mm cannon pods with 500 rounds total of HE ammunition,
2 x fixed forward firing 7.62mm miniguns with 9,000 rounds of ammo,
4 x 7.62mm machine guns operated as twin doorguns either side with 3,000 rounds total ammunition.
With that payload, there would still be 600 pounds plus weight availability for EOTS or FLIR and other niceties like defensive suites and some lightweight armour around the engine and transmission.
The 7.62mm miniguns were absolutely essential in Vietnam to provide very close accurate high density fire as close as 10 metres from friendlies in jungle engagements.
The NC621 low recoil cannon pods are in common worldwide use and easily fitted to the Bushranger in lieu of the 2 x 7 round rocket launchers with 17 pound warheads. The safety distance for unguided rockets was about 150 metres in my day whereas HE cannon around 35 metres; so, 500 rounds of 20mm potentially much more useful and damaging than 14 x 17 pound warhead rockets. We did use Flechette rounds also which certainly cannot be safely delivered near friendlies.
The Huey II Bushranger could be fully fuelled and rearmed in 15 minutes with aircrew also assisting the armourers. Cruise speed about 100 knots, which matters nought in the target area, and fuel endurance 168 minutes with nil reserves.
The Huey II is of course very low cost at around $2million and very cost-effective to operate. The Mi-24 and Mi-17 are comparatively large platforms and I have not researched unit costs and economics.
In earlier years in exercise MANPAD scenarios, we found it safer to operate at low level making it much more difficult for the operators to get a missile lock-on. Missile technology would have course since improved.
Re Tiger. Public info says the French can only carry about 220 rounds of 30mm in Afganistan and less than a full load of rockets when based at around 6,000 feet AMSL, with fuel loading unknown.
In the Australian configuration, Tiger has no gun/cannon redundancy and the single high recoil weapon fitted apparently has a cooling cycle limitation for sustained firing. It will ultimately really hammer the somewhat understrength airframe.
If I were tasked to try and make the bloody things better suited for possible Australian military roles, I would shed the rockets and substitute 7.62mm minigun pods from Macchi, which might still be in storage. Alternatively, podded .50 inch weapons are available. Multiple weapon redundancy and accurate high volume fire is absolutely essential for close quarters support of ground forces.
Regarding MANPAD battlefield 'domination'. It is always a command prerogative what level of risk in combat is acceptable, although some losses are inevitable. If anybody is reluctant to provide a capability due to risk, then you immediately afford the opposition a big psychological advantage.
Well bushranger obviusly someone is already using this type of helicopter in Afghanistan , click on the link below:
http://www.airliners.net/photo/Untitled-(US-Department/Bell-UH-1H-Huey/1196465/
And the State Department operates refurbished S61's.The british operated their Sea Kings with new rotors etc.
The Australian Navy could not wait to get rid of their Sea Kings.
For bushranger :
http://i.imgur.com/9Savs.jpg
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