My question would be: why would Defence need to look at an artillery piece made by Korea that weighs 47 tons? Where would it be used in this region?
Defence cancelled the the LAND 17 project as part of a recent budget cut, however it seems like we dodged a bullet.
Self-propelled arty sounds nice but the M777 is much easier to move around with air assets.
31 comments:
Easier to move around.But look at the effort and manpower to sustain fire.The whole thing is manually operated,including laying,elevation etc..
Ater a few hours in the sun,you are not going to be happy.
Another machine such as the G5, has hydraulic everything, including flick ramming and limited self propulsion.
The K9/K10 combo has another purpose,keep going with the flow.
You need all three.
Another reason is counter battery fire...
i.e. the M777 no one is under cover. so what happens if the guns themselves start getting shelled?
Who is going to be moving assets by air? Its clear that the Australian Navy is going to be the instrument of power when it comes to expeditionary warfare for the Australian military. The Australian Air Force, like Air Forces everywhere are being seen for the real limitations that they bring to the combined arms force. The Army and Navy will team up and moving these beasts will be no problem at all. The Air Force? Just keep the skies clear if you can, if you can't the Air Warfare Destroyer will pick up the slack!
Good point,moving assets by air.Australia does not have any,apart from 2 part time Chinooks availble at anytime,oops we have now lost two.
Against emerging air threats, the "Air Warfare Destroyer" can only be a target.
How about Archer? 17 tons lighter, wheels and fits in the A400. Similar speed and range but cheeper to use. MRSI, crew of three and a HMG on top. Whats not to like? Norway and Sweden have ordered 48 (approx.) so why not order 24 (to start with) and press for a good prize.
Best regards
/Sebastian
Whichever Anonymous; this from Latitude 72 North.
You are clearly brainwashed by Canberra thinking. The RAN is in a diabolical mess and cannot possibly be remediated within a decade. The Australian Army has had delusions of grandeur and a lessening amount of its hardware is suited for regional wet tropics archipelago operations.
Australian military experience since WW2 has underscored need for compact air deployable forces; yet these lessons are not being heeded by DoD planners who are drawing incorrect conclusions from the largely non-combat East Timor intervention. We are simply not capable of deploying sizeable expeditionary forces around the globe.
The sooner the relatively modest scope of Australia's defence capacity is realised, the better value we might get from taxpayer funding of defence.
There are two reasons why Australia wanted a heavy self-propelled gun capability.
The first was informed by their experience being supported by Dutch PZH-2000 155mm guns in Afghanistan. These guns were the only in-direct fire support available in Tarin Kowt available when Taliban and AQ fire support (rockets and mortars generally) were raining down on Australian and Allied support bases.
Towed weapons such as artillery and mortars are fine when it's one way traffic, but operational experience showed gun crews need armour protection on the gun when rockets and mortars are landing on them, or the troops in contact don't get fire support.
Vehicles like Archer, have an armoured cabin, but the gun crew still has to go outside the vehicle to reload it and it has a small on-board ammunition supply. Again, fine if you're only on a one way range... K9 has an armoured supply vehicle (K8) and all reloading, moving and firing is completed entirely under armour.
The second reason is that vehicles like the K9 or PZH-2000 have a sustained fire and extended range capability that can't be matched by any towed gun crew.
A single PZH-200 or K9 effectively provides the same firepower over time as 3x 155mm towed guns, plus it has significant levels of protection and mobility.
A modern towed gun requires an armoured gun tractor, an armoured resupply vehicle, plus the gun itself, so your not saving an awful lot by choosing between a towed gun setup properly equipped over an SP gun, but the money can be spread over multiple projects over time (LAND 17 and LAND 121 Overlander in this case).
"These guns were the only in-direct fire support available in Tarin Kowt available when Taliban and AQ fire support (rockets and mortars generally) were raining down on Australian and Allied support bases."
Which makes one wonder why would we send troops in harms way without organic support after spending so many zillions in taxpayer bucks.
Funny too, a few years ago, just sending a few mortars to Operation:USELESS DIRT... was... a DM level decision. LOL
http://ericpalmer.wordpress.com/2010/09/22/3-years-ago-sending-a-mortar-team-to-afghanistan-was-a-dm-level-decision-military-auspol/
But yeah, 47 ton beast. One should have sent attack helicopters along with the ADF for OUD. Oh.. we are short of those. BTW we also had JTACS and F-111s to send along at the time too. Or Hornets.
Meek war plans suck. Even worse when the mission provides no valid defense for the nation.
They did have organic support:
25mm Bushmasters, 12.7mm guns, 40mm auto-grenade launchers, 66mm M72A9's, Charlie G's, Javelin ATGW and Mag-58's.
Their indirect fire was provided by the main force in their area of operations - the Dutch, who provided overwatch for our forces.
That overwatch including PZH-2000 155mm guns, MLRS, 81 and 120mm mortars, AH-64D Apache and F-16's.
We deployed 81mm mortars in support of our forces, when we began to move out entirely from that umbrella. Now our support is provided by USMC with M777A2, AH-1Z and whatever fast air is available in the tasking order.
Anonymous, Australian forces in Afghanistan, receive support from the NATO helicopter fleet, just like any other force there does. NATO has a much greater level of helo support than Aus Army Aviation could ever provide, no matter which platforms it operated.
Our two Chinooks are part of the NATO helicopter force. They are not serving in direct support of Australian forces in Afghanistan, except when they are assigned that tasking, just like any other helo in-country.
Btw, we purchased two more -D models late last year and they have been brought up to the same spec as our existing models. We now have 7 Chinooks available for operations.
Eric, yes sending 81mm mortars was a Defence Minister level decision. Not the mortars themselves, but the addition to the capped deployed force we sent there. The cost of using the mortars themselves was negligible, because it meant we didn't have to purchase use of them from allied nations.
However, deploying a mortar troop meant increasing the size of our deployed force, or reducing the size, nature and taskings of the deployed combat teams in country.
So yes, it was a DM level decision. The decision was made to increase the size of our deployed force. As it was when we deployed the Heron's too.
We had and have JTAC personnel deployed in Afghanistan both in Special Forces and conventional units, since 2001 in fact.
Yeah we could have sent F-111's, Hornets or the Tiger if we had really wanted to.
Again, another DM level decision, one that wasn't made.
Also, what's the great issue about the weight of the K9 or PZH-2000, Eric?
I don't see many bemoaning the deployment of the 50t 2 Combat Engineer Regiment armoured D9 bulldozers we have in Afghanistan.
Those ones that were airlifted there...
I see Lt Colonel Bonza/Gary is defending the indefensible again.
I do agree that the SP artillery is a requirement, however other forms are also needed.
The organic air supoort by Army is non existant as demonstated in Afghanistan.
Goodness, what we do if we actually have to deploy all by ourselves.
However what has been demonstrated is the inability of Defence and DMO to actually achieve what is needed.
Still perplexed, here is a great example for you to define your argument.
1) you still agree that SP artillery is a requirement - good, so no argument there.
2) Organic air support is non existent. This is because the coalition provides it. ADF air assets in theatre are allocated as ISAF sees fit. similarly coalition air assets are often allocated in support of ADF operations. That is the nature of a coalition.
3) What would happen if the ADF deployed by themselves.. 1) tiger, chinook, blackhawk, hornets and Sooper Hornets are all available.
4) Blah Blah DMO not providing anything - this is the only thing that I dont get, please frame your exact argument. What havent DMO provided that is needed for example.
Its obvious by the bloviating by some that all weather, sustained fire support is to be denied the Australian Rifleman just so the Royal Australian Air Force gets a few more toys. That is flawed thinking. The force that is in need is the Army. The force that is shaping the future of Australia's defense needs are the Army first and foremost with the Navy second. Quite honestly, outside of heavy airlift, all the support for Australian Army needs could be supplied by the Navy by transferring a few assets and buying F-35B's.
Anon said:
"Blah Blah DMO not providing anything - this is the only thing that I dont get, please frame your exact argument. What havent DMO provided that is needed for example."
Really, and how many years and projects , do you want me to go?
Hello Bonza (from Norway).
Considering past lessons of Australian involvement in warfighting, tracked 155mm artillery (US Army) certainly proved its worth in Vietnam. But the plethora of towed stuff owned by Army would be of limited value in the regional wet tropics. Self-propelled 155mm deployable by C-130 ought to be the requirement as the C-17 will be somewhat limited regarding airfield suitability.
Coming down the integral firepower scale, Vietnam again proved the merit of an M113 Fire Support Vehicle and other nations have adapted this platform for 120mm mortars. A turreted cannon and 120mm mortar fitted APC would have been the ideal FSV for regional wet tropics operations, if it had also been kept as C-130 deployable.
Army/DMO hugely cocked up the M113 upgrade program and there was arguably no need for acquisition of the expensive and somewhat more limited ASLAV.
It is long overdue that the politicians and DoD were more objective about the parlous state of the ADF. These days, the Navy is struggling in almost every aspect of its roles and the Army is not suitably equipped for regional wet tropics operations in most respects.
PNG was principally developed by air resources which remain the principal communication and support means. But Australia continues to discard air capabilities that were most suited to those environs. The competence of Australian defence planners, including the military hierarchy, just has to be seriously questioned.
perplexed..
Land17 project itself is fine.
Thank you Mr Sycophant,glad to hear the news.
Hi Bushranger, hope you're enjoying the trip to Norway!
The air-mobile 155mm gun system you propose can only be referring to the French Caesar system. It's the only gun I can think of, offhand that could meet your requirements. Even the Archer someone mentioned earlier is over 30 tonnes and therefore not C-130 capable.
However the French Caesar will suffer from most of the issues that M777A2 and Unimog or MAN truck gun tractor combo will face in the tropics, namely a reasonably heavy 4x4 vehicle trying to get through thick mud... Unlike the M777A2 however Chinooks won't be lifting Caesar anywhere, but they can move an M777A2 and a Mog just fine.
In addition, whilst it may technically be portable in a C-130, the weight of Caesar is right at the maximum load limit of the C-130 and will severely inhibit it's range and STOL capabilities (such as they are). In this environment at least, air portable towed guns, that we employed so successfully in Vietnam, are likely to again prove most useful.
As to the M113AS4, we have M113AS4 mortar carriers, they are equipped with the in-service 81mm mortar system, but with space and weight allowed for heavier systems (120mm mortar).
We may well end up with heavier mortars under the Land Force Mortar replacement project (heard some rumours but nothing concrete as yet).
As to ASLAV, they were some strange thoughts, given it has a completely different role to the M113AS4. ASLAV's are demonstrably superior to any M113 variant in the Cavalry role and have excelled in Iraq, Afghanistan and surprisingly, even in Timor during the tropical season on operations.
I'll grant you an ASLAV would make a poor APC, so it's lucky we don't use them for such.
Remember how the Aussies entered both World Wars; they had no ready army, they had to mobilize, train and add equipment.
A big conflict (~an important one) would require this in the future as well. the ability to buy additional kit during the accelerated arms build-up prior to a war should weigh heavily in procurement.
The institutional knowledge of how to use modern self-propelled artillery would be important for training (wheeled SPHs with very limited traverse and manual loading are as similar to a Thunder or PzH2000 as is a 120 mm mortar).
The standing army ought to buy the time for the force build-up, not win big wars with peacetime strength. Its employment in great power gaming is a poor idea as well.
SO, you are correct.This nation does not learn from History.
Sir John Monash sais this after WW1
"It may be appropriate to end this memoir on a personal note. I have permitted myself a tone of eulogy for the triumphant achievements of the Australian Army Corps in 1918, which I have endeavoured faithfully to portray. Let it not be assumed on that account that the humble part which it felt to my lot to perform afforded me any satisfaction or prompted any enthusiasm for war. Quite the contrary.
From the far-off days of 1914, when the call first came, until the last shot was fired, every day was filled with loathing, horror, and distress. I deplored all the time the loss of precious life and the waste of human effort. Nothing could have been more repugnant to me than realisation of the dreadful inefficiency and the misspent energy of war. Yet it had to be, and the thought always uppermost was the earnest prayer that Australia might forever be spared such a horror on her own soil.
There is, in my belief, only one way to realize such a prayer. The nation that wishes to defend its land and its honour must spare no effort; refuse no sacrifice to make itself so formidable that no enemy will dare to assail it. A League of Nations may be an instrument for the preservation of peace, but an efficient Army is a far more potent one.
The essential components of such an Army are a qualified Staff, and adequate equipment and a trained soldiery. I state them in what I believe to be their order of importance, and my belief is based upon the lessons which this war has taught me. In that way alone can Australia secure the sanctity of the territory and the preservation of her independent liberties.
Such a creed is not militarism, but is of the very essence of national self-preservation. Four long years before the war it was a creed of a small handful of men in Australia, who braved the indifference and even the ridicule of public opinion in order to try to qualify themselves for the test when it should come.
Four dreadful years of war have served to convince me of the truth of that creed, and you confirm me in the belief that the men of the coming generation, if they love the country, must take up the burden of these men have had to bear."
"said"
Since self-propelled 155mm guns are an expensive option, a cheaper way to provide the Army with mobile protected fire support would be to upgrade its M113AS4 mortar carriers from 81mm to 120mm. Combining mobile 120mm mortars with the range of the M777A2 would provide a battle group with indirect firepower that can be transported by both air and amphibious lift.
NGF, that would be nice if they were available on a basis that could be called reliable.
Another triumph by the DMO
http://www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports/2011-2012/Upgrade-of-the-M113-Fleet-of-Armoured-Vehicles
SP, you are right - the M113 upgrade has been another poor DMO performance. However, as an optimist, I see the AS4 as an interim capability that can be useful for training and low intensity scenarios until a new combat vehicle is delivered under Project Land 400 - one day!
Hi again Bonza,
My point re the ASLAV is its not really an adequate multi-role platform for Australia's needs and is utilised primarily as a gun carriage, whereas various forms of cannon can be fitted to other vehicles.
The Howard Government initiated Force 2030 big spend program was never going to be affordable and would have required an unrealistic compounding increase in Federal Government revenue. It is inevitable in my view that all 3 Services will eventually be forced to rationalise their roles due to soaring operating costs and the emphasis will need to point back toward the longstanding Principles of War, VERSATILITY and FLEXIBILITY, regarding hardware choices.
Arguably, the range of mechanised vehicles and firepower platforms for the Army has become too broad and those better suited for general purpose needs would be more cost-effective. As Eric has óften opined, ´just too many toys in the sand-box` for all 3 Services.
Bushranger,affordability is not the problem.Waste,stupity,incompetence and dishonesty is.
Bushranger, ASLAV's are used to provide overwatch and escort, a classic Cavalry function. It's 25mm based firepower is made use of certainly, but you seem to be suggesting we'd be better off with the same firepower and targetting capability fitted to another vehicle, presumably an M113.
Where this falls down, is attempting to use an M113 for a purpose IT was not designed for. We don't use ASLAV's for close combat tasks. Accordingly we should not attempt to use M113's for scouting, recon and overwatch and escort tasks, the ASLAV is much better suited to. If you'll recall, we spent nearly two years in the early 90's, trialling the existing 2nd Cavalry Regiment capability (M113's) against a similar formation equipped with LAV-25's, the USMC variant of our own ASLAV's. In Northern Australia on exercise and in a variety of operational environments since, the ASLAV has proved an outstanding vehicle for our needs and one much more suitable than the capability it replaced.
You say the range of armoured vehicles Army operates is too broad, but that is an interesting proposition when the reality is Army operates 3 types of armoured vehicle, each for a specific role.
M113AS4, ASLAV and M1A1. That is Army's entire variety of armoured vehicles. Each are good at their role. Each suffer a variety of issues when attempting to employ them in other roles. Considering any of these as "toys" and presumably thus "disposable" demonstrates a lack of understanding over how Army generates combat power and what combat power is intended to achieve.
Arbitrarily deciding that three types is "too many" based on some generalised idea that this is too wasteful, is interesting given it is coming from the same source that consistently argues for the "de" rationalisation of ADF helo types (by reintroducing previously retired types) and RAAF transport assets.
Hi Bonza,
Yesterday, I looked at an NM135 Stormpanservogn, an unstretched M113 APC fitted with a turreted 20mm cannon and7.62mm machine gun, both of which can be operated when buttoned down. Plenty of room for a 120mm mortar and ammo operable through the sizeable hatch at rear of the cab. Comprehensive comms and defensive suites fitted and the vehicle as configured is probably C-130 portable although I have yet to confirm. The Norwegians have operated them in some pretty dangerous environs. Flexible thinking somewhat foreign to the Australian DoD.
And yes, I do advocate recovering utility helo capacity, both Blackhawk and Iroquois, which no military planners in their right mind would shed. The Blackhawk fleet apparently has about 4 different mod states so how can such a situation emerge?
Despite the posturing of Abbott & Co., the Force 2030 proposition was always an impossible dream and ADF operating costs over the next couple of years will force a big reality check in Canberra. The so-called Helicopter Strategic Master Plan is an ongoing disaster that has arguably squandered billions of dollars and diminished Australia's military capacity.
Look at how quickly the Army was able to adapt in the late 60's with the M113 fitted with the Saladin and then Scorpion turret.
Imagine the DMO trying something like that today, at at what cost.
Look at the time and cost to provide a simple upgrade to the
M113 fleet recently.
http://www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports/2011-2012/Upgrade-of-the-M113-Fleet-of-Armoured-Vehicles
And BR, you used the correct term"right mind". Remind me how well the Tigre and MRH 90 projects are progressing.
Sure Perplexed,
IOC for the Tiger (many years late true enough) is scheduled to be declared in December. Full operating capability, will be declared when all support assets are in place, full crews are trained and all contracted EW upgrades are delivered.
Army effectively has a full squadron of Tigers available for operations now, with formal signing off for this, scheduled in December 2012.
MRH-90 (again many years late) is similarly nearing IOC for the Navy. It is deployed on exercise Croix Du Sud in New Caledonia at present and during the deployment will undertake it's Naval Operational Test and Evaluation which will inform it's IOC decision. If there are no issues, the IOC won't be too far off.
Army is similarly nearing IOE&T for IOC of it's MRH-90 capability within Army. The project has a long way to go, but some light is at the end of the tunnel at least.
No cheerleading. Just a statement of fact as to how things are, today. Personally I wish we'd opted for AH-1Z Cobra and rebuilt our current S-70A's to the UH-60M Blackhawk standard, with a 12 aircraft or so new build to fill the "additional airlift squadron" requirement and Navy getting the MH-60R and MH-60S combo, but that wasn't to be.
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