"The so-called Helicopter Strategic Master Plan is an ongoing disaster that has arguably squandered billions of dollars and diminished Australia's military capacity."
From a different time:
"The so-called Helicopter Strategic Master Plan is an ongoing disaster that has arguably squandered billions of dollars and diminished Australia's military capacity."
12 comments:
Army chose the unproven Tiger and MRH90 over the battle proven Blackhawk and Apache.
Now the MRH90 is on the Projects of Concern list. And according to the Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, some in Army are talking about scrapping the project and buying more Blackhawks from the US. The idea would be to handover the existing 18 MRH90's to the Navy: http://apdr.realviewtechnologies.com/?iid=68889#folio=42
The Blackhawk (possible)purchase was mentioned as a backup by head of Army Aviation ealier this year?They were seeking details on costs and the conversation is in Australian Aviation magazine.
Interesting that Sweden made an emergency buy of UH60M for service in Afghanistan in 2013, noting that NH90 would not be in service until at least 2017, even though they have been in possession of NH90 for some years
MRH-90 isn't getting cancelled. We've got 18 airframes now, we've spent billions on getting the program to where it is today and Navy is only a few months away from declaring IOC on it, as it's Seaking replacement.
Army is a bit further away, but the program is getting back on track. As much as some might think otherwise, it isn't going anywhere.
It's late. Yes, we know. It isn't over budget however and while AAC would have preferred UH-60M (which is why I would have) Department of Treasury got it's way, ADF didn't. So like 13 other national users, we're stuck with MRH-90. Army didn't choose MRH-90. The National Security of Cabinet did. New-build UH-60M was Army's choice.
Tiger IS back on track, at least as far as being a useable asset for the defence of our nation. It's original timeline is of course massively blown out.
In fact it is already at IOC within Army. This will be formally signed off in December. FOC is not dependent on the aircraft itself, but aircrew, EW, support and training assets. Somewhere in the late 2013/14 period we'll finally see FOC for the Tiger.
Aussie Digger,Oh dear, defend the indefensible,again.
A fact is a fact Perplexed. The Tigers after a long gestation are operational and MRH-90 are closing in on being operational too.
Neither has been a great program, but they ARE starting to deliver what they are intended to do.
How that is "defending the indefensible" is beyond me. Is the sky blue Perplexed? Is grass green?
These are facts. You can deny reality if you like. Meanwhile Army and Navy will get on with using their Tigers and MRH-90's for the things they are meant to do, whilst you continue to sprout meaningless catchphrases.
You are correct, facts are facts.
Latest figures for flying hours last year.
(unofficial figures to June indicate no improvement)
Tiger. Expected,6000 hours. Achieved, 2,413. Just 40%.
MRH 90.Expected ,3,420 hours.Achieved,943 hours. Just 28%.
Operating costs:
Tiger $13,430 hour.
MRH 90 $31,790 hour.
Black Hawk $11,470 hour (and can actually land in paddock)
Yep, IOC real soon
Also suggest you read BR71 remarks in lead post today for a better take on the subject
Hello again Bonza,
Am now back south of the Equator with body clock slowly adjusting.
Your 27 October update on projects good feedback; but I still have great difficulty with the apparent determination of DoD to progress the very flawed Helicopter Strategic Master Plan, at whatever cost.
The spectrum of essential battlefield roles performed by utility helos seems not properly appreciated. Broadly speaking, they were designed to be pretty light versatile platforms that can cost-effectively provide primary battlefield support below the capacity levels of medium lift helos. In that context, the design of the Huey II excels whereas the Blackhawk UH-60M is twice as heavy, 10 times more costly and much more expensive to operate. Over 5,000 upgradeable Huey versions are still in service worldwide and will be supportable long term.
The MRH90 was marketed as an MLH although DoD keeps insisting that it is suited for utility helo functions, but at what cost per unit and flying hour? Upgradeable Iroquois are still being wasted and same is intended for Blackhawk, if the HSMP rolls on. And; there still seems the very questionable intent to acquire an expensive twin-engine unarmed LUH downstream, ostensibly for basic helo training requirements.
A notion that the MRH90 will also provide a combat air assault capability from LPD platforms seems way out of touch with prudent methodologies for conduct of highly complex and sluggish amphibious landings in the modern context of operations. These days, small groups of Special Forces would logically secure onshore landing areas before streaming of force build-up by helo and landing craft means, so massed helo insertions are simply not appropriate. Why therefore put a sizeable complement of helos aboard sea platforms for very limited usage?
All that considered, I ponder how DoD planners could determine that 46 x MRH90 were justifiable or necessary and I really cannot see proper role applicability for all of those expensive to operate MRH90, no matter whether Army or Navy.
Same logic can be applied to virtual shedding of the vital boarding party capability by acquiring UH-60R instead of upgrading the existing Seahawk fleet and acquiring some more versatile UH-60S.
Acquisition decisions hitherto made are of course now history; but would it not now be prudent to jettison or at least freeze what is proving fundamentally flawed planning and determine what might be done to cost-effectively remediate ADF helo fleet structuring?
The structure is quite straightforward Bushranger. ADF acquired 46 MRH-90, Army didn't.
Navy has 6 MRH-90 on strength based at Nowra to replace it's Seakings, leaving Army with 40.
Army will have 3 squadrons of 12 aircraft, 2 within 5 Avn Regt to support "green" ops and 1 within 6 Avn Regt to support Special Operations. 4 more MRH-90 are to be on strength with Army Aviation Training Centre, Oakey (HQ 16 Brigade).
The reason that 3 squadrons of MRH-90 were acquired, as opposed to the 2 squadrons of Blackhawks we operate (as operational aircraft) is that the MRH-90 replaced the operational role the UH-1H used to.
Whether you consider it the appropriate aircraft or not, it has replaced the UH-1H within AAAVN.
It just now has to develop and replace the Blackhawk. I don't agree with that decision, but there it is.
Perplexed, regardless of those figures, IOC is approaching for both platforms. Flying hours were down because of flight operations suspensions for both platforms at various times of the year.
Neither are mature platforms yet, but they ARE heading that way, with Tiger being much the closer.
Thank you Bonza for some crystallization, but interesting questions emerge.
The Air Force achieved on-line availability of 83 percent for Iroquois during Vietnam operations; 13 of 16 aircraft continually available over 5.5 years. That efficient use of resources could not be emulated after Army Aviation takeover of battlefield helos in 1989 and outsourcing of much aircraft maintenance came into vogue. On-line availability of Blackhawk these days is not known.
Until recently, there were 25 Iroquois and 35 Blackhawk, so 60 aircraft previously satisfied Army utility functions and a gunship capability, when required to be activated. Operating costs of that fleet were quite acceptable due mainly to the cost-effectiveness of the Huey.
On present planning, there will be 40 MRH90 for Army and 22 Tiger to accomplish the fore-mentioned capabilities. Only 40 (MLH) platforms to perform utility functions previously accomplished by 60 aircraft, diminishing force strength by around 33 percent.
If 'X' number of flying hours were required from a 60 aircraft fleet to provide Army fighting arms with adequate role support, will the same number of hours be flown from 40 MRH-90 and 22 Tiger? On-line availability of these more complex types will also presumably be lower and they will be very expensive to operate.
As mentioned elsewhere, aircrew proficiency will become a big issue (if not already) that will only be partially offset by synthetic flight training (simulators).
I am really just postulating thoughts here because I see operating costs across the whole ADF becoming a very major issue that will inevitably cause some rationalisation of force structuring. Army has apparently already been forced to put some hardware in storage and that may also become necessary for the other 2 Services.
It will be interesting to see how overly ambitious planning has to be modified over the next decade.
Lieutenant-Colonel Bonza/A.D.
Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee; issued Aug.
28, 2012)
" The problems identified in defence procurement, however,
are largely a function of the organisation's own making"
"The committee finds that the current management structure in Defence has produced an
organisation that lacks a robust risk management regime: an organisation where its
personnel are insensitive or unresponsive to risk, where no one owns risk. Defence is
also an organisation that seems incapable of learning from past mistakes"
Firstly would I suggest that you or closely listen to comments made by Bushranger.
Regarding the Tigre, selected in 2001, planned IOC 2008, perhaps reaching same in December 2012. 11 years to field a system?
This machine will never perform to its contracted requirements, as it is seriously flawed. 2001 I was working for a company doing risk assessments, which was involved in Air 87. The work took me constantly to Oakey, and we spoke at length with those in Australian Army Aviation. Right from the start it was obvious that the thing was underpowered and could not operate successfully in hot and high regions, or the geography in South-East Asia. The solution from the French team," turn up the wick, cobber."
They also however had deep-seated concerns regarding spare parts, support and the fact that the machine was nowhere near operational in France or Germany. DMO in their wisdom did not see this as a problem. I am informed that between the French and DMO a lot of red wine was consumed during the process.
The same problems exist today, a flawed and failed logistics system and poor support.
Regarding the MRH 90, my contacts advised me that the supply spare parts and support from the parent company is pathetic. In addition many components are failing at a fraction of their indicated life, and there are also the well-known problems regarding the inability to land on rough train, and general fragility of the machine itself.
Once again many years late.
Your indication that the flying hours of some you do with nonavailable flyable machines to problems is correct, however the major problem is the ones mentioned above. Once again indicating an immature and evolving platform.
Decision to purchase both of these machines shows a deep flaw in the management system as found by the Committee on 28 August 2012.
Further evidence is indicated by the Swedish decision to purchase the UH 60 M service in Afghanistan, as they believe that the NH 90 would not be available until at least 2018, even though they have been in possession of the airframe for some years.
The German defence forces have also written scathing report regarding the suitability of the NH 90 and, something that Bushranger will like, is it they plan to keep the Huey in service for many years yet due to the problems with the suitability of the NH 90.
Further comment regards the obvious inevitability of IOC of the MRH 90, lies in the fact that in July 2012, Helitech was awarded a four-year contract for $128 million for maintenance of the Black Hawk and Seahawk fleet, with an option for a further six years.
Something further that Defence and DMO have not taken into account, is the concept of attrition or wear and tear. On reading various audit reports and other articles emanating from the United Kingdom, they have come to the conclusion that there is requirement of at least a four times availability of helicopters, to ensure one rotation.
Amazingly, the NAO, found that there were insufficient spare parts resulting in cannibalisation, no forward planning, and low availability due to the consumption of parts in a harsh environment. It took them years to catch up.
We cannot keep the Tigre nor MRH 92flying the budgeted flying hours in a benign environment, I wonder what would happen if we act you had to use them? I refer to my quote from the Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee: issued August 28, 2012.
My apolgies for the spelling, new version of Dragon(12), and not checking same.
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