Commentary of the day by EP
The four year contract with Sikorsky Helitech is for the provision of maintenance and engineering services in support of the Black Hawk and Seahawk fleets, with options to extend for a further six years.
The MRH-90 flying rate of effort has been less than planned, leading to significant delays in aircrew training and certification. To address this, the DMO is working closely with industry in 2011-12 to improve the immature support system, aircraft systems reliability, and contractual arrangements.
Phase 7 of the ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan (HSMP – Projects Air 87 and Air 9000) embraced in DCP2009 aimed at introducing 'the new Helicopter Aircrew Training System (HATS)' and prospective platforms being aired for this role are all twin-engine types. This irrationality apparently derived from an obsession to reduce the number of helo types in service (presently 7 plus some leased platforms, with Iroquois and Sea King having already been shed) to as few as 4 types – see http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/dcp/html/air/AIR9000.html .The recently published DCP2012 persists with the same very costly capability diluting program for restructuring of the ADF helo fleet, but no longer refers to 'as few as 4 types' – see http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/CapabilityPlan2012.pdf , Page 68. Basic flying training, fixed or rotary wing, is overwhelmingly universally conducted on pretty simple single-engine platforms that should also desirably be low cost regarding operation and maintenance. Teaching people to fly on multi-engine platforms, whether in military or civil aviation, would be needlessly complicated, expensive and foster accident potential. So why is the DoD intending to deviate from common world practice? Presumably, the Army Aviation originators of the HSMP strategy have succumbed to lobbying from defence industry endeavouring to market newer costly platforms less suited for very basic roles, which Army Aviation apparently also envisage as an LUH in lieu of Iroquois foolishly forfeited.The single-engine Kiowa is a widely used basic helo training platform with other well proven military applications and is supportable well into the future due to commonality with models in civilian usage worldwide. Similarly for the Squirrel and both types also have potential for basic training of other helicopter aircrew categories. That they are both from differing international stables matters nought as they are wholly-owned assets performing useful roles with other proven applications in battlefield reconnaissance and general fleet support respectively. Versatility of these types and their cost-effectiveness is quite obvious, so why would anybody contemplate replacing them both with more complex and arguably inappropriate platforms at unit cost of up to $7million? If rationalisation of training platforms were seen as beneficial, then perhaps sale of Squirrels and acquisition of more Kiowa would be logical, as a cost neutral exercise!Synthetic training warrants mention, but its applicability and benefits directly relate to platform complexity. At very basic levels, aids like Cockpit Procedures Trainers are appropriate and perhaps some Aircraft Systems Trainers with broader usability for technical training. Flight Simulators (fixed base and/or motion types) have revolutionised aircrew training around the world over the past 50 years, but the economics of their acquisition need to be carefully considered. In a commercial sense, they are only justifiable if there is sufficient utilisation, which is why training centres have been developed around the world with aircrew flying from all parts of the globe for mandatory checking and training. Retaining suitably qualified technical staff to maintain simulators at adequate standards has hitherto been a significant problem. In a military sense, simulators can do some magic things, but justification for their high cost acquisition and relatively low usage in small air forces needs careful consideration. The extent to which synthetic training is envisaged as part of the HATS notion might arguably be an inappropriate and expensive overkill.Some focus from me on battlefield utility helicopter functions in the near future.
Interesting, Sweden has announced that they believe the IOC for the NH90 will be 2020.Also interesting is the emergency buy of the Blackhawk for use in Afghanistanin 2013.Germany at the moment, who knows.Another triumph fo Defence et al.
The Huey II conversion by the way includes complete rewiring, corrosion proofing and multiple other enhancement options not mentioned in Eric's beaut little booklet. Bell also permit the manufacturer approved upgrade to be accomplished by approved agencies around the world.Why then was it necessary for Australian Helicopters to get involved with EADS regarding the Tiger and MRH90 when we had the local capability to optimise the UH-1H Iroquois fleet without the involvement of foreign defence industry? Just another example of the influence exerted in Canberra by lobbyists for the big multinational arms conglomerates.
This contribution addresses battlefield utility helicopter functions.'...The (US) Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a "platoon carrier," different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander...' (Statements within quotation marks are extracts from an Air Mobility 1961-1971 Vietnam War study by LTGEN John J. Tolson, US Army).Agile (nimble) utility helos are a battlefield imperative for troop movement, casevac, ammo resupply, logistic support and a whole bunch of other roles for suitable flexible and versatile platforms. Doorgun armament is essential in engagement situations and particularly where other protective fire support is not available, as in the following anecdote. Location Bien Hoa Province near FSB Bearcat 1968. V Coy, 4RAR engaged with enemy and requiring ammo resupply. Albatross arrives at scene of action in moderate height jungle and manoeuvres over weapon muzzles to begin dropping ammunition at Coy forward positions. Noise of battle deafening with intense continuous small arms fire from both sides within cricket pitch proximity. Further manoeuvring to winch out a casualty with near vertical doorgun suppression as necessary.'...Statistics on relative vulnerability show that out of 1,147 sorties one (US Army) aircraft would be hit by enemy fire, one aircraft was shot down per 13,461 sorties, and only one aircraft was shot down and lost per 21,194 sorties... Used properly the helicopter was not the fragile target some doom-forecasters had predicted...' The Huey has been proven to absorb an incredible amount of battle damage, although some light-weight armouring around the engine and transmission would be beneficial. Not much has changed since the Vietnam War regarding weaponry threats, with MANPADS not dominating battlefieldsComparing Huey II with Blackhawk, the principal difference is a superior cabin layout in the Iroquois with the 2 rear crew stations clear of main cabin space and gunners able to step somewhat outside the aircraft to suppress rearwards. Blackhawk was designed to carry a squad (section) of 10 men and Huey II has performance to do likewise with reconfigured clip-in seating, although a bit cramped. Blackhawk is faster, has longer range and can lift a little more externally than Huey II, but is twice as heavy and H2 has superior hot and high performance. Blackhawk was designed for enhanced battlefield survivability, but is about 5 times more costly to operate. Unit cost of UH-60M is about $20million and Huey II around $2million.The recently published ADF Defence Capability Plan 2012 persists with a very costly capability diluting program for restructuring of the ADF helo fleet aiming to shed ALL real utility helo capability (Iroquois and Blackhawk) with ultimate acquisiton of a twin-engine machine ostensibly for training, but apparently also viewed as a light utility helicopter (LUH) – see: http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/CapabilityPlan2012.pdf , Page 68. Such platforms are designed to carry just 2 pilots and varying passenger payloads, but have no provision for rear crew doorgun stations. Unit cost may be as high as $7million with operating cost likely to exceed Huey II due to twin-engine complexity considerations. The notion that these machines can adequately perform the utility helo roles of Huey II and Blackhawk reflects lack of appreciation by Australian defence planners regarding effective battlefield support.
Some posts repeated on Eric's 'Helicopters for the ADF' thread.
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Phase 7 of the ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan (HSMP – Projects Air 87 and Air 9000) embraced in DCP2009 aimed at introducing 'the new Helicopter Aircrew Training System (HATS)' and prospective platforms being aired for this role are all twin-engine types. This irrationality apparently derived from an obsession to reduce the number of helo types in service (presently 7 plus some leased platforms, with Iroquois and Sea King having already been shed) to as few as 4 types – see http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/dcp/html/air/AIR9000.html .
The recently published DCP2012 persists with the same very costly capability diluting program for restructuring of the ADF helo fleet, but no longer refers to 'as few as 4 types' – see http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/CapabilityPlan2012.pdf , Page 68.
Basic flying training, fixed or rotary wing, is overwhelmingly universally conducted on pretty simple single-engine platforms that should also desirably be low cost regarding operation and maintenance. Teaching people to fly on multi-engine platforms, whether in military or civil aviation, would be needlessly complicated, expensive and foster accident potential. So why is the DoD intending to deviate from common world practice? Presumably, the Army Aviation originators of the HSMP strategy have succumbed to lobbying from defence industry endeavouring to market newer costly platforms less suited for very basic roles, which Army Aviation apparently also envisage as an LUH in lieu of Iroquois foolishly forfeited.
The single-engine Kiowa is a widely used basic helo training platform with other well proven military applications and is supportable well into the future due to commonality with models in civilian usage worldwide. Similarly for the Squirrel and both types also have potential for basic training of other helicopter aircrew categories. That they are both from differing international stables matters nought as they are wholly-owned assets performing useful roles with other proven applications in battlefield reconnaissance and general fleet support respectively. Versatility of these types and their cost-effectiveness is quite obvious, so why would anybody contemplate replacing them both with more complex and arguably inappropriate platforms at unit cost of up to $7million? If rationalisation of training platforms were seen as beneficial, then perhaps sale of Squirrels and acquisition of more Kiowa would be logical, as a cost neutral exercise!
Synthetic training warrants mention, but its applicability and benefits directly relate to platform complexity. At very basic levels, aids like Cockpit Procedures Trainers are appropriate and perhaps some Aircraft Systems Trainers with broader usability for technical training. Flight Simulators (fixed base and/or motion types) have revolutionised aircrew training around the world over the past 50 years, but the economics of their acquisition need to be carefully considered. In a commercial sense, they are only justifiable if there is sufficient utilisation, which is why training centres have been developed around the world with aircrew flying from all parts of the globe for mandatory checking and training. Retaining suitably qualified technical staff to maintain simulators at adequate standards has hitherto been a significant problem. In a military sense, simulators can do some magic things, but justification for their high cost acquisition and relatively low usage in small air forces needs careful consideration. The extent to which synthetic training is envisaged as part of the HATS notion might arguably be an inappropriate and expensive overkill.
Some focus from me on battlefield utility helicopter functions in the near future.
Interesting, Sweden has announced that they believe the IOC for the NH90 will be 2020.
Also interesting is the emergency buy of the Blackhawk for use in Afghanistanin 2013.
Germany at the moment, who knows.
Another triumph fo Defence et al.
The Huey II conversion by the way includes complete rewiring, corrosion proofing and multiple other enhancement options not mentioned in Eric's beaut little booklet. Bell also permit the manufacturer approved upgrade to be accomplished by approved agencies around the world.
Why then was it necessary for Australian Helicopters to get involved with EADS regarding the Tiger and MRH90 when we had the local capability to optimise the UH-1H Iroquois fleet without the involvement of foreign defence industry? Just another example of the influence exerted in Canberra by lobbyists for the big multinational arms conglomerates.
This contribution addresses battlefield utility helicopter functions.
'...The (US) Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a "platoon carrier," different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander...' (Statements within quotation marks are extracts from an Air Mobility 1961-1971 Vietnam War study by LTGEN John J. Tolson, US Army).
Agile (nimble) utility helos are a battlefield imperative for troop movement, casevac, ammo resupply, logistic support and a whole bunch of other roles for suitable flexible and versatile platforms. Doorgun armament is essential in engagement situations and particularly where other protective fire support is not available, as in the following anecdote.
Location Bien Hoa Province near FSB Bearcat 1968. V Coy, 4RAR engaged with enemy and requiring ammo resupply. Albatross arrives at scene of action in moderate height jungle and manoeuvres over weapon muzzles to begin dropping ammunition at Coy forward positions. Noise of battle deafening with intense continuous small arms fire from both sides within cricket pitch proximity. Further manoeuvring to winch out a casualty with near vertical doorgun suppression as necessary.
'...Statistics on relative vulnerability show that out of 1,147 sorties one (US Army) aircraft would be hit by enemy fire, one aircraft was shot down per 13,461 sorties, and only one aircraft was shot down and lost per 21,194 sorties... Used properly the helicopter was not the fragile target some doom-forecasters had predicted...' The Huey has been proven to absorb an incredible amount of battle damage, although some light-weight armouring around the engine and transmission would be beneficial. Not much has changed since the Vietnam War regarding weaponry threats, with MANPADS not dominating battlefields
Comparing Huey II with Blackhawk, the principal difference is a superior cabin layout in the Iroquois with the 2 rear crew stations clear of main cabin space and gunners able to step somewhat outside the aircraft to suppress rearwards. Blackhawk was designed to carry a squad (section) of 10 men and Huey II has performance to do likewise with reconfigured clip-in seating, although a bit cramped. Blackhawk is faster, has longer range and can lift a little more externally than Huey II, but is twice as heavy and H2 has superior hot and high performance. Blackhawk was designed for enhanced battlefield survivability, but is about 5 times more costly to operate. Unit cost of UH-60M is about $20million and Huey II around $2million.
The recently published ADF Defence Capability Plan 2012 persists with a very costly capability diluting program for restructuring of the ADF helo fleet aiming to shed ALL real utility helo capability (Iroquois and Blackhawk) with ultimate acquisiton of a twin-engine machine ostensibly for training, but apparently also viewed as a light utility helicopter (LUH) – see: http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/CapabilityPlan2012.pdf , Page 68. Such platforms are designed to carry just 2 pilots and varying passenger payloads, but have no provision for rear crew doorgun stations. Unit cost may be as high as $7million with operating cost likely to exceed Huey II due to twin-engine complexity considerations. The notion that these machines can adequately perform the utility helo roles of Huey II and Blackhawk reflects lack of appreciation by Australian defence planners regarding effective battlefield support.
Some posts repeated on Eric's 'Helicopters for the ADF' thread.
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