Smaller F-35 fighter program: A fundamental rethinking of the F-35 fighter, our biggest defense procurement program, is appropriate — in light of the dramatic effectiveness of drones and other new technologies and the large size and cost of the manned-aircraft program.
Specifically, the F-35 program should be sized primarily to the potential China threat. Imagining a major deployment of F-35s to the region around Taiwan, for example, on land bases and ships, might result in halving the program’s size (with refurbishments of planes like F-16s making up the difference).
A good place for them to start would be here.
4 comments:
Refurbishing F-16s in the interim period does nothing to recapitalize or offset a rapidly hollowing TACAIR capability and receding deterrent over the medium term -- the term seeing increasing uncertainty and increased potential modern threats than at any time since the end of the Cold-war (per QDR).
The unplanned and unexpected widening of the capability gap, due to severely miscalculating policymakers 'staying the course' on the unsustainable and defunct F-35-or-nothing recapitalization strategy, is significantly contributing to an accelerated shift in the balance of power.
The argument used more and more often lately, that refurbished F-16s (late block F-16, with early blocks likely having no budget, or just flat out not being technically feasible to refurb for an extended timeframe) are some kind of a 'Plan B', is only deceiving and further compounding the ability of current policymakers to grasp the escalating risks and dangers at hand.
And in closing, I wish these influential houses would discontinue utilizing actual hypothetical 'Taiwan' scenarios to argue their positions. First of all, it's completely counter to the core strategic ambiguity policy and thus weakens the US's policy vis-a-vis China/Taiwan, but secondly, it's some pretty provocative rhetoric that will likely only complicate the dynamics at play, by bolstering Hawks at the expense of moderate forces within the ever flowing tides of power.
Keep the scenarios and requirements generic and germane to simply maintaining balance of power and meeting the needs of regular recapitalization (in the most prudent, strategic and effective manner... not via the service of the Military Industrial Complex) until the day when diplomats alter the environment otherwise. You'll gain a lot more credibility and likely come up with more practical and appropriate policy analysis.
Brewster Buffalo - rather appropriate for the deployment of JSF's in Asia
Someone at Brookings has been reading too much SLD!
I hope Brewster Buffalo history does not fortell F-35 future. This from Wkipedia:
A design in 1936 for a carrier-capable monoplane resulted in the Brewster F2A (named Buffalo by the British), which was chosen over an early version of the F4F Wildcat. The F2A prototype handled well in 1938 tests, and the Navy ordered 54. However, production was slow, at least partly due to an inefficient factory in Queens, New York. The Navy ended up ordering Wildcats, which by 1938 had been greatly improved.
The Buffalo was exported to Finland starting in 1939, and more were intended for Belgium, but the country was overrun in the early stages of World War II, before deliveries could begin. The United Kingdom also received Buffalos, which eventually ended up in the Far East. They engaged in combat with Japanese Zeros and suffered badly. The Buffalos were most popular with the Finns, who not only used them successfully against the Soviet air force but even built a slightly improved version known as the Humu. The Dutch also purchased 92 Buffalos and assigned most to the Militaire Luchtvaart KNIL in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) where they fought against the Japanese. Several captured by the Japanese were repainted with Japanese Hinomaru insignia and extensively tested.
During WWII it became apparent that Brewster was mismanaged. The company had grown from a relatively minor aircraft parts supplier to a fully-fledged defense giant in only a few years. Jimmy Work had hired Alfred and Ignacio Miranda as the company salesmen. They had been involved in frauds, spending two years in prison for selling illicit arms to Bolivia, and had over-promised Brewster production capabilities to customers. As WWII had swelled the defense industries, the quality of the newly-hired work force was inferior in skills and often motivation, and the work was plagued by illicit strikes; even outright sabotage was suspected. The Navy installed George Chapline as president of the company, easing out Jimmy Work, in the hopes of speeding up production, but then in early 1942 Jimmy Work regained control, just in time to be sued for US$10 million for financial misdeeds. In May 1942 the Navy simply seized Brewster and put the head of the Naval Aircraft Factory in charge.
When the Navy cancelled Brewster's last contract, for assembly of the F3A-1 Corsair, the company was in serious trouble. In October, after reporting a large loss, the management decided to shut down the company, and on April 5, 1946, the Brewster Aeronautical Corporation was dissolved by its shareholders.
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