Joint command attitudes have improved, but how much?

How much duplication of effort in missions can we afford within the services? What should each service really be doing? How much realignment of the services and trimming of duplication of roles and missions should be done?

Here is some interesting history that points to duplication of effort.

Interestingly in the great unpleasantness that was the Vietnam War, U.S. Navy aircrew had a try with the OV-10 in the Mekong Delta region. Read all of that story here. It was a time when “Jointness” was still a theory. The services were territorial to the extreme.

We shared a good working relationship with an Air Force tactical air support squadron (TASS) flying the infamous Pushme-Pullyou (O-2). They made no attempt to control us. However, they were often able to give us good targets while they waited for their tactical aircraft. This cooperation ended when a TASS FAC told a very tardy flight of F-100s, "Jettison your bombs here. The Navy has already hit my target." From somewhere on high came a directive that Air Force FACs would no longer work Navy air. About a month later, as a TASS FAC tried to steer my flight of OV-10s into a night action involving U.S. advisors in an overrun South Vietnamese Army outpost, an authoritative voice over the radio forbade the FAC's involvement. Ever the professional, he remained on station "inadvertently jettisoning" flares until we could arrive overhead. That such a "my war, my glory" attitude could get in the way of supporting those poor SOBs on the ground was deeply disillusioning. In time, the policy was rescinded.

Maybe in some ways, it still like that.

"C-12 early flight of the Army's CEASAR EW capability. CEASAR is designed to conduct electronic warfare from above the battlefield. CEASAR will give the Army an organic beyond line of sight electronic attack capability designed specifically to address the concerns of the land forces.

Was the USAF ever consulted on a need for a capability "designed specifically to address the concerns of the land forces?" And if if not, why?

If this and other small war missions--like tactical airborne ISR and close air support--are being effectively done by the Army, why is the USAF involved other than to be a air bridge logistics enabler? And even that is being contracted out.

I fully understand big anti-access war needs but if Army Aviation is capable of "addressing the concerns of land forces" in a small war environment, are we at the juncture where service duties have to be looked at with a greater scrutiny of who should do what?