With the failure of the Defence establishment to maintain non-complex ships as shown in recent debacles, there comes a bright spot or two.
The first was buying the Bay-class ship from the U.K. The second good idea is that Defence is looking at acquiring a home-built logistics catamaran used by the U.S. military. This same kind of ship was rented locally for past Australian Defence operations.
Three of the vessels have served with the US Navy and the US Army. The RAN was slow to recognise their value until the Timor crisis in 1999 when an 86-metre jet cat ferry, previously running between Melbourne and Hobart, was leased by the navy. Renamed HMAS Jervis Bay, the ship earned the nickname Dili Express as she transported personnel and materiel over the Timor Sea continuously for the two years of the emergency.
If this order happens, I compliment Defence on some smart thinking.
16 comments:
Is this the same crowd making the LCS - which is now corroding terribly?
Yeah, but at least this design is proven with knowns.
LCS is Austal.There is also another player, Incat of tasmanaia
No this is not the same company.
The LCS #2/4 manufacturer is Austal from Western Australia who have teamed with GD to produce them on a production line in the US (Mobile, Alabama?). Also it's a trimaran, not a catamaran. And given Austal's market success and previous experience building Naval and Customs/Police patrol vessels, I doubt the corrosion problems being talked about are due to anything inherently wrong with their in house design process. It may be a problem with GD or the skill level of the US based workers or incorrectly supplied materials, or the USN may have insisted on a materials list or combination that simply doesn't work well. Without knowing the exact teaming arrangements it's difficult to say, but I doubt it's incompetence by the designer.
As for Incat, well they are based is Tasmania and if this plan comes to fruition all I can say is "Hallelujah!", somebody finally saw the light. This is exactly the kind of vessel the navy should have been ordering before the Canberra/Juan Carlos's. It's only been what 12 years since HMAS Jervis Bay proved the concept to the RAN, USN and indeed the world. Better late than never I guess?
For the price of 1 LHD we could probably buy 6 of these 112m high speed vessels offering far faster response time and infinitely greater flexibility. The problem with the LHD's is that if you only need a low level response, say a couple of helicopters, you have to send the whole 27,000 tons and all that extra crew. Plus you need a reasonably deep water wharf something the wave piercers dont require.
Flip the argument on it's head and you need a greater response from the Incat's and you just have to send more of them. If one goes U/S, no problem you still have another/others on station and probably can send another to relieve it. We could purchase a fleet of at least a dozen of these for less than the price of the LHD's and have all that redundancy. The only drawback I can see is that at present they are limited to a 2000nm range. However most of what we SHOULD be doing with vessels like these lies within that circle. It may be possible for Incat to extend the range as I seem to recall Austal offering range increases on it's similar cats. It might also be possible to purchase a couple of modified hulls that are equipped as high speed tankers to extend the range, or manufacture kits that can be dropped in complete with main deck tanks and at sea refueling gear.
$100 million each, makes everything else seem obscene doesnt it? About the price of an MH-60R now that I think about it.
Thanks for the clarification Goldeel1.
What may be interesting is how Austal and Incat compare in quality for this kind fo ship.
Hopefully it won't be an opportunity for another DMO gaff.
A good idea if it occurs. They will need more than one for obvious reasons but if they have two or three of these types of ships it will give the navy enormous flexibility. The LHD capability is the high end heavy lift capability with the catamarans being much quicker and nimble but far less supportable for long periods. Thus a regional issue could see a cat despatched with a chopper, medical team, forklifts/bulldozers/ front end loaders/ engineers, supplies etc and perform the recon of the problem and report back. Navy then can decide whether the cat is enough, maybe send another cat or whether a LHD is required.
You could see both the LHD and cats working together with the LHD acting as a form of mother ship. The cats could also form a logistics train back to a forward port running people and things back and forwards to the LHD leaving the big ship on station for longer. How the cat fits in with war fighting is another matter but for lower end stuff the cats as was seen in Timor were invaluable.
As far as rust issue go I read that the Austal LCS didnt have a cathodic sacrificial system installed.
Wait until DMO get hold of the project.
5,000 modifications, large project team of hundreds and watch the cost spiral.
Hopefully Defence will just purchase it as is
Both manufacturers have vessels on lease with US forces. Incat for somewhat longer.
Both apparently impress
Something which was called for two months ago in Australian Defence Business Review (ADBR) I believe.
Peter,
If what you say is true about the Austal LCS not having a cathodic sacrificial system installed this is so shocking that it borders on the bizarre. Ship maintenance 101 for the last 100 plus years has seen the need for sacrificial anodes to reduce or remove the problem of dissimilar metal corrosion. To find that it has not been fitted to a brand new naval vessel and one made from predominantly aluminium leaves me speechless. This cannot be incompetence, it has to be deliberate. I simply dont believe that Austal would have done this through their own incompetence, it has to be someone else. This actually lends some weight to my theory I brought forward the other week after seeing the Lockheed LCS with unsightly corrosion, that it is being done as either a deliberate test of both ships or someone is trying to sabotage the program. It's like failing to put oil in your car and then wondering how long it takes before it seizes.
The Incat solution might provide some useful short term solution but as a replacement for a proper amphibious ship they simply don't cut the mustard. Here's a comment on the issue from a mate of mine who now runs a private shipping company and is ex-RAN amphib group (who served on Jervis Bay back in the day too).
Look up the dead weight of the vessel and you will find is is in the hundreds of tonnes (about 627 tonnes at 38 knots and only 300 at 42knots) not thousands. This is borne out of the fact it is a HSC and is, by virtue of that, tonnage limited. This DWT includes fuel, water, food, sewage, crew and stores.
Now look a fuel cost (noting you are burning MDO) . The HSV2 has a normal capcity of 190 cubes. If you sacrifice dead weight (i.e. less cargo) you can increase this to 210 cubes. At normal capacity - in smooth water - the range at 35 nots is just 1100nm meaning 31 hours operating. That is 125 tonnes a day. A 33000 tonne RO-RO burn about 90 tonnes of HFO.
380 cs currently sells for about $630 USD a tonne, MDO/MGO at about $900 USD a tonne. So for a 24 hour period you can carry 630 dwt tonnes for about $112.5K or 33000 dwt tonnes for $56.7K........... and you can carry it further .......... and in adverse weather you can carry it at the same speed or faster.
Note: those speeds quoted by INCAT are only for a smooth sea state and anything above calm reduces your achievable speed and your fuel burn. Anything approaching force 5 and you head for a port ...... at reduced speed.
Where the HSC wins out is when its operating economics are compared to aircraft when you what to get personnel and some light gear to a place quickly and over a short range. This is what the USN use them for and it is quite successful, however, the fact that they run so few indicates they are not about to replace the heavy lifters. Also don't forget they normally only have sitting accomodation. The HSV-02 is better but only has sleeping berths (spartan bunk rooms for most) for 107. It can only feed 35 at a time. The washrooms and sewage facilites are not designed for extended operations either.
By the way these girls need a port to unload. If you want to carry choppers to do the job then deduct a whole lot more off the dwt to do it as the aircraft, crew, stores, fuel etc are all deductions.
Given our budget and these issues why would we spend $100m on a HSC when you can charter them in if needed. For that money chase another heavy lifter that can go to a place and provide sustaind support.
Don't forget, LHD's carry LCM's and helo's to get the stuff to shore. Not many wharf's stand up to tsunami's and the HSC's stay at sea and so does all the stuff without a wharf...
LPDs for the ADF will prove a big mistake in my view as aircraft carriers were previously shed due to operating cost penalties and sustainability issues. The dubious F-35B may have been a consideration in their acquisition, despite denials.
Too many eggs in one LPD basket is military folly, as proven in the Falklands War, and the escort penalties for the smallish ADF will be significant.
The problem is Australian defence planners are still brainwashed by East Timor intervention believing that we should have capacity to move largish expeditionary forces.
The more likely regional need is for quick deployment/withdrawal of smallish light forces which means adequate tactical air resources, supportable of course by suitable amphibious capacity.
Something like Galicia class or Type 071 vessels would have been more appropriate for Australia's amphibious support needs, complemented by say versatile LSVs which are easily adapted for flexible roles. See this very interesting article: See the very interesting article this link: http://newwars.wordpress.com/2010/07/28/lcs-alternative-weekly-35/
Hey bushranger, interesting comments, but there are dome curious ones too.
You mention the escort penalties of LHD's almist directly after the idea that we should have more, smaller amphibious vessels.
Whether you move your force in one ship or 10, if the threat is there so is the escort requirement. I can't speak from experience but even the multiple 'small' amphibious ships of the size and capability of Manoora, that you need to match the capability of one LHD (landing helicopter dock) aren't going to be especially difficult for an enemy to detect if they are trying to land a concentrated force somewhere, the ability to concentrate force still being a useful military capability I presume?
The problem of sustainability of multiple vessels not to mention crewing then becomes an issue.
The LHD's are going to be truly massive ships. (The joke going around is that when one is tied up at Garden Island, Russell Crowe won't see the sun until midday) but they are designed to deliver but also support just a single battalion group. That is not a huge force and most contingencies that ADF will deploy to, won't see less than a battalion grroup.
Op. Anode for instance in the Solomans was that size and took the combined capabilities of Manoora and Kanimbla to deliver that single battalion, plus half a dozen Blackhawks. Tobruk was also employed bring the Kiwis and the follow-on force of engineers and their kit.
God forbid another contingency occurred during that time because the only element of RAN's amphibious group left was the Balikpapan Class and they don't go anywhere much unless the sea-state is completely smooth.
I doubt we'll ever see ADF owned F-35b's operating off the LHD's because they will impinge on the amphibious capability too much. If they were looking at that idea they'd need a third LHD at least just to maintain the planned level of amphibious capability, probably another AWD as well for escort purposes and the jets themselves and there is no political will or funding available to match that level of investment...
Hi Bonza.
As with majority of ADF hardware resources these days, 50 percent availability for operations is perhaps a realistic punt. Certainly for 2 LPDs after the bright shiny smell wears off, considering the docking time necessary.
As you said, deployment of a battalion group via multiple vessels to the Solomons worked and they were lesser high value targets than would have been the case with too many assets in a single ship (a la Falklands).
But my major point is would we not be better off with more smaller amphibious resources to assure better availability and allow for some losses? Hordes of helicopters are simply not necessary and types like Galicia can embrace medical facilities, command and control functions, etcetera. Comparative costs unknown but methinks 3 of those would have been better value than 2 LPDs.
Even Galicia class support might be an overkill once a force has been lodged. The versatile LSV at 6,000 tonnes displacement, good range and a crew of 29 seems a very capable and more seaworthy vessel for work around the archipelago compared with the Balikpapan class at near 500 tonnes with a 13 crew complement.
I ponder whether the Australian Army would limit itself to deployments no smaller than a battalion group, as independent company group operations seem favoured by middle-ranking Army people with whom I have had beers. Lower level, short term interventions in the island chain might be appropriate in some circumstances, if assistance is requested by neighbouring States, to avoid the tag of 'occupiers', as is now happening in East Timor. In such circumstances, speedy deployment by tactical airlift and amphibious support by say LSVs might be a more appropriate level of activity.
Just musings of course, but it is pretty clear to me that Australian defence planners are bent toward larger scale military involvements with hardware that is largely too sophisticated and costly. I see ADF military capacity declining and not really improving with present capabilities planning intentions.
I also understand that the Class is too large for the docking facilities in Townsville?
I.e that is the LSD.
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