If the full sequestration were to take effect, "we're going to have to look completely at the [F-35] programme," US Air Force chief of staff Gen Mark Welsh told the Senate Armed Services Committee on 12 February. "It's going to be impossible to modernize."
The consequences operationally would mean that the US Air Force would not be able to operate as effectively in contested airspace as it had planned. "Our kick in the door capability would be impacted," Welsh says.
The F-35 was never going to "modernize" the USAF tac-air community. If anything, it would be a negative affect. The F-35 has an alarming cost in both per-flying-hour and procurement. It will be too weak to take on emerging threats.
The F-35 is unable to help the USAF, "operate as effectively in contested airspace as it had planned".
Until that is agreed upon, the USAF's ability to perform air supremacy will be impacted.
What is needed? New production of an evolved F-22B that has acceptable maintenance metrics.
And, new-build legacy aircraft for those times when high-end threats are not part of the operational picture.
8 comments:
Would the F-22 "Bravo" be exportable?
My impression from the analysis done for the FB-22 was that the evolution and modifications were still quite substantial (the CRS report suggested that it was tantamount to designing and building a new aircraft).
If that is in fact that case, the F-15SE (which hopefully South Korea will select) strikes me as the better alternative; balanced LO, giant sensor/jamming apertures supported by generous power margins. And best of all, it has two seats.
The catastrophic aspect of USAF's imminent TACAIR implosion is that since the 1997 timeframe (eg, 1997 QDR), the strategic 'game plan' has been one in which everyone agrees that TACAIR 'Modernization' and recapitalization to be essential, required and well-established by around 2020.
The only problem with that 'requirement' is that the strategic, cough, planning camp and policy-dictation forces that be since around 1997-1998 (and especially since 9/11/2001) has been focused on the pre-conceived success and industrial win-win-win of the F-35 JSF in providing for that capability!
Note: it was ASSUMED as recently as 2007 by policy-makers and JPO office programmers, that by FY2020 there would be about 1,300 USAF F-35A fighters procured!
Note: it was ASSUMED that an effective F-22 would be procured already in sufficient numbers.
Note: it was still ASSUMED (advertised) as recently as 2007/2008 that SDD phase of development would be achieved by Oct of 2012 and that IOC of F-35A would be achieved by 2013!
Never mind what GAO and CBO and even CSBA were saying and warning all along - ie, 'caution: unreliable, risky, uncertain, Not credible, Not accurate'.
Where there is a fatal flaw tragically still today in official strategic planning and policy making circles, is that powers and members that be would unfortunately rather save their respective careers and let the Program fizzle out by default with a 'good college try, albeit finger-pointing at something else' attitude... even with No Plan B interim contingency TACAIR strategy in implemented... than to have raised a red flag earlier on last decade or still today and said something like: "hey guys, let's at least get some near-term/medium-term contingency TACAIR recap going in next years FY Appropriations Budget, while we wait for JSF to mature and prove itself as viable?!"
Two seats? A fighter pilot would rather have the fuel. There is less and less use for a backseater in a bomber and none for a fighter.
To Marauder,
Eric (I think) was proposing more of an F-22B follow-on derivative of the F-22A in the medium-term, as opposed to a full-on redesign FB-22 proposal which you seem to have implied?
Moreover, the F-15SE has still a considerable way to go to mature in development and prove itself as a feasible option. Perhaps an F-15SE-lite, or even an F-15E++ would be the more prudent incremental evolutionary path in the near-term.
Regardless, an F-15E+ option in the near-term, as well as an obvious alternative option for enhanced F-16C+ models could be (should have been) the interim stopgap recap policy -- to maintain deterrent capability -- while an F-22B variant (possibly with an exportable model) could indeed be developed separately as a medium-term solution, per alternative TACAIR roadmap.
Personally, I'd even consider studying the possibility of jointly-developing/producing either Korea's or Japan's next-gen Fighter concept as a poor-man's Plan C, possibly in lieu of the F-22B concept.
Either way, it's arguably way over-due that USAF should consider something strategic-contingency-wise, along the lines of say, a 12-year $4.2Bn annual Combat Aviation Procurement budget in 2013 dollars (including future Tactical UCAV procurement) to work with. Argue and confirm that contingency requirement to Congress in direct negotiations per strategic plan, critical to National deterrent and maintaining baseline capability.
Secure a known, 'fixed' budget such as the noted (hopefully doable) figure (eg, $4.2bn) with which to plan an actual strategic medium and longer-term TACAIR Recap and modernization plan -- a plan which has been in death-spiral mode (chaotically, unsustainably and catastrophically) with hardly any recap and fairly nominal modernization (innovation) since 1997's QDR!
Any required 'kick the door-in' deterrent and capability shortfall in the medium-term should be augmented by asymmetrical stand-off munition procurement. Not a stay-the-course, 'kick the can down the road' plan.
Hello again Anonymous
Developing an F-15SE-lite, or even an F-15E++ would be the more prudent incremental evolutionary path in the near-term if the F-15SE doesn't work out. That's a great alternative TACAIR roadmap you put their.
The two-seat F-22B model was cancelled in 1996 for cost savings, or is the F-22B designation will be used as a follow-on derivative of the F-22A in the medium-term, as opposed to a full-on redesign FB-22 proposal?
Or how about the new designation called the F-22E Super Raptor as opposed to a full-on redesign FB-22proposal?
Regards
"What is needed? New production of an evolved F-22B that has acceptable maintenance metrics."
No more rewarding LockMart for their egregious errors. The contract should be directed elsewhere.
To new build production of the F/B-23.
Also known as the Rapid Theater Attack concept from Northrop.
Better signature management than the F-22. Much longer legs unrefueled. Substantially larger internal weapons payload. Just what the Pacific pivot requires.
And this time, sell it to interested Pacific allies!
Ladies and Gentlemen,
There still remains the fundamental question put to AM Angus Houston and his people back in 2006 and, more recently, to Gen Dave Hurley that they still haven' been able to answer; namely:
What is Australia (and America, for that matter) going to do in the post-2015 stealth-on-stealth/counter-stealth world when capabilities, both airborne and surface based, that have been designed to go up against and be competitive with the F-22A Raptor are proliferating into the region?
What is Australia (and America, for that matter) going to do in the post-2015 stealth-on-stealth/counter-stealth world when capabilities, both airborne and surface based, that have been designed to go up against and be competitive with the F-22A Raptor are proliferating into the region?
Super F-15s and F-111s and mythical FB-22s DUH!!!
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