In 2002, then Defence Minister Hill decided that Australia should participate in the risky F-35 program. The safe tender process, was abandoned. Who advised Mr. Hill this was such a great idea?
Just a few years before, Defence started a purge of senior leadership. The results of this purge were that critical thinkers, the language of engineers and proper leadership technique would be abandoned for corporate group-speak and group-think. Many important decisions would be made by whichever powerful, yet unskilled team of bureaucrats happened to be in power at the time.
The results of this have been a tree which produces rotten fruit: a poison upon proper military leadership and management competence.
Australia’s galactically bad decision to pick the F-35 didn’t happen in a vacuum. The effects of sexual harassment, bullying, bad procurement decisions, poor maintenance of ships, are all from the same cause: a toxic leadership climate. This now deskilled military leadership produces bad advice because it is unable to produce anything but.
Tonight at 8:30 East coast time, Four Corners will have a program about the severe problems with Australia’s involvement in the troubled F-35 program. It is a companion piece to a program they did back in 2007. That and this score-sheet on Defence spin are important viewing.
Parliament is what makes things happen in Australia. It will take Parliament to seriously change the military. How they can do that and manage the rent-seeking behavior and me-first attitude of the whole of the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy will be the ultimate challenge. If Parliament continues to fail in this arena, military capability will continue to erode.
20 comments:
Problem is, if the f35 is no good and the f22 is unavailable, which fighter can Australa procure which will be competitive against upcoming 5th generation designs from China and Russia ? Everything else is just a tarted up design from the 1970's.
Great question. The U.S. has to either restart F-22 production (with an evolved "B" variant that removes all of the F-22 design failures, or, get out of the air supremacy business, which makes TEAM AMERICA: World Police a dicey proposition even without the massive debt. In-turn, there has to be an export-friendly F-22. Too politically unworkable? Well, then again, the alternative is bye, bye air supremacy.
How much do the F-22 cost to operate? $40000+ per hour?
And where the F-35 will end is an open debate but an estimate of $30000/h?
The F-22 performs well where the F-35 just dont.
Say they start up a F-22B production line - I can't imagine that it will be cheaper to operate then the legacy F-22 but it would surely have a far better chans of reaching air supremacy.
Would US afford it?
And would they dare pulling the plug on the project with the shame it carries?
Another way to restart the F-22 production is evolve the Raptor design to the F-22E and FB-22A while providing a less "technology sensitive" version of the F-22 for those partner nations willing to remain with the program.
Hi Eric,
I agree that an exportable F-22B variant would be a great idea - as long as it were produced in sufficient volume to make it affordable.
But the problem is that the F-22B does not exist, the Silent Eagle is not in production (and may never be), and you rightly have grave concerns about the F-35.
Given the above, what types of real world aircraft, or combination of aircraft, would you have the RAAF consider in a tender to replace the Classic Hornet?
Well, first we have to go by the advice of the beloved NACC. They stated in 2004, that if the F-35 failed, that we would start over with a clean sheet of paper. First step? NACC has to recognize (and advise) that the F-35 program has failed.
What is amzing that even now after the Pentagon had to water down the performance requirements of the F-35, not one civilian or military official either here in the US or abroad has had the courage to acknowledge that the F-35 will not cut it. That's where Hagel may be helpful. If he breaks that cycle and truncates the entire F-35 program including cancellation of the F-35C and no more than
300 F-35As, a solution will be found quickly which could include rapid development of an air superiorty version of the F-35 with 2 engines, thrust vectoring etc, or of the F-XX. Also, buying a few hundred new F-15 Silent Eagles and F-16 with ISRT and Aesa will help to temporarily fill the gap and is much cheaper than this sinkhole called the F-35. Australia should look at the F-15SE. Lastly, Cassidian's passive radar technology will prove deadly to Stealth putting a big question mark on this all Stealth air force delusion of the USAF
"we would start over with a clean sheet of paper. First step? NACC has to recognize (and advise) that the F-35 program has failed".
Fair enough. But what would you write on the clean sheet of paper? What should be the second step?
These questions are not rhetorical. I ask because I'm genuinely interested in your views about the options given the aircraft that are on the market, or likely to be on the market, in the next few years.
Regards.
It is not that simple. Whole communities in the Defence Establishment have to be changed in a big way. Otherwise, simple projects become medium risk. Example: building the wrong sized landing craft. Medium risk projects become high-risk. Example: Helicopter projects gone bad. High-risk projects become pure fantasy. Example: subs, and F-18 replacement. So until that is changed in a big way, it is a really bad idea for the taxpayer base of 20-some million people (er..um less than that as this is an entitlement society where many don't work) to hand over tens of billions of dollars to a bunch of incompetents.
With respect to either restarting a redesigned F-22B line (or develop a clean-sheet alternative, eg, F-23, etc) and w/ respect to AUS's insufficient military leadership, those are longer term challenges quite likely needing to be tackled.
However, in the interim, ie, the near-term, there is an immediate fighter gap and immediate stopgap requirement needing to be addressed, given the flawed and unsustainable F-35 acquisition plan.
So it's very clearly a two-point Tacair recap plan of attack needing to be implemented here:
1) a near-term emergency stopgap solution which could perhaps be in the form of an 8-12 yr Lease (eg, more Supers).
2) a follow-on, next-gen 'tactical' recapitalization plan probably comprised of a 'mix' of platforms (manned and unmanned) which could consist of a future derivative of the F-22 (or something similar, eg the Korean fighter concept, a Boeing design, or Japan's concept if someday for sale, etc).
Perhaps another option satisfying the near-term stopgap requirement would be to SLEP the legacy hornets, upgrade them, skip additional Super Hornets and go for an overlapping-generation approach to recapitalization. For example, open a Phase I tender for around 50-60 jets to be delivered starting around 2018-2019. Entrants could include souped up, late variant EF Typhoons, Rafale, and an F-15AU pathway. A separate Phase II could include a plan to acquire say 10-12 VLO UCAV capable of strike. To round off the mix, perhaps 20 Super Tucano could be procured in the short-term as well as the unmanned prop UAV.
Another next-gen radical concept could include perhaps 2-3 high-altitude very-large Air-ship capable of long-range surveillance/Early-warning, telecom link and possibly even as a launch platform for cm-intercept missiles/laser?
Hello Anonymous (Feb 18, 1:58PM).
The discussion here is about a whole raft of bad decision making, but you seem to be advocating compounding that situation by inferring that emerging threats justify another knee-jerk reaction to fill an assumed capability gap.
We have not yet seen an updated national strategic assessment which ought to be the basis for DWP2013. Given the performance of successive governments in that regard, I am sceptical that it will be sufficiently objective; more likely to at least partly justify a raft of hitherto questionable procurement decisions.
The bottom line in my view is that there is no imminent external threat to Australia and the greatest risk is from within. China has a strengthening economic stranglehold and can exert that influence in multiple respects. Indonesia simply does not have the capacity nor the intent for such action which would of course negate the progress they are making in development of their nation.
The whole Defence Capability Plan ought to be trashed with reconsideration of just what capabilities are justifiable within affordable defence spending to enable credible deterrence of interference with our trade corridors and better shaping of mobile quick reaction ground forces to provide regional assistance, where requested.
But I do agree with your thought that the whole RAAF strike/fighter/close air support/training package
warrants review rather than just presently being focused on replacing the F/A-18s.
There was much in the 4 Corners report that was disheartening in the extreme, (although little that was surprising for anyone who has followed the debate here).
I couldn't help but feel that the war game played out by the retired AWO, where the cyber F35s, weapons expended, were attempting to exit the battle area but were being outrun and shot down by the cyber Su27s, would cause some moments of sober introspection among the young men and women sipping their coffees in the crewrooms at Willy this morning.
I was uncomfortably reminded of one of those 'moments' in Australian history involving Wirraways, Rabaul and gladiators' salutes to an uncaring Caesar.
Bushranger,I really think that threats can appear when noit expected.eg Timor.
And this is interesting.
http://afr.com/f/free/blogs/christopher_joye/worry_about_war_and_loose_money_Knwb8G2Hh22gJMeDLU70ZN
''would cause some moments of sober introspection among the young men and women sipping their coffees in the crewrooms at Willy this morning. ''
Contraries, it was the source of much laughter and lamenting over journalism standards.
Anon 10.18 said: "Contraries, it was the source of much laughter and lamenting over journalism standards."
That worries me even more. Is it lack of imagination, (giving the usually fond 'knucklehead' tag a whole new meaning), or does the desire for the new toy - any new toy - override the concerns we've seen expressed here by Eric and elsewhere by people who would seem to know what they're talking about?
"Is it lack of imagination, (giving the usually fond 'knucklehead' tag a whole new meaning), or does the desire for the new toy - any new toy - override the concerns we've seen expressed here by Eric and elsewhere by people who would seem to know what they're talking about?"
Neither, it was just the utter amateurishness of it!
Negative on that, Bushranger.
That was not compounding on the raft of bad decision making, rather that was discussing some alternative contingencies with the intent of being more prudent and less risky, compared to the unsustainable, highly speculative, stay-the-course recapitalization plan.
A short-term interim stopgap (albeit expensive, no doubt, thanks to the F-35 pathway) would arguably seem to be imminent; be it some additional Hornet SLEP and systems' upgrade, or perhaps an additional Lease. (a follow-on SH Lease order being my opinion, rather than a buy). The goal of the Lease would be to buy time to make a more strategic and prudent, clean-sheet recap plan by the early 20s. It would buy more time to indeed evaluate and assess AUS's more accurate strategic requirements in terms of Australia's overall contingency planning and balance of next-gen force needs to face potential threats. Not lock oneself into the current acquisition plan which is massively expensive and highly uncertain in terms of reliable capability and replacement.
That's a prudent contingency option, not a compounded bad decision, sir.
It allows for flexibility in fulfilling actual requirements as assessed in the next 5 years (truly uncertain post-cold-war times in terms of unknown intentions, capabilities, stability and security), balance in cost-capability force-structure and more strategic-oriented strategy making.
It would allow contingencies to be better decided on, given the possible maturity level of potentially available platform options in 6-7-8 years out, etc, as well (if in fact need be!).
I'm fairly sure even you would accept a shift to more robust, modernized Tactical and strategic capabilities and deterrent if a turn in stability and security and/or threat level did or was assessed to in fact emerge over the next 5 years?
And lastly, no, I agree with you, one does not put in stone today a fixed long-term acquisition process based on a conceived threat one sees only today. Absolutely, one should allow for more flexible adjustments in acquisition requirements and procure a mix of 'cost-effective' capabilities as need be, accordingly. That would be prudent.
Anon 10.18
Look at how many projects Defence got right in the last 10 years.
And this will be different?
Hello Anonymous (3:29AM). I could have better expressed that I was referring to the whole discussion this thread and not just your contribution.
I commend you for proposing solutions, but I feel it more beneficial just to consider the bigger picture rather than get too focused on particular platforms.
As Eric has intimated in several threads, the RAAF has arguably always been too focused on having all top end capabilities for its strike/fighter components. Way back in my time, it was viewed as anathema to suggest interfering with the Air Order of Battle.
Defence policy has as its primary plank support of defence industry which is now largely foreign-parented sucking profits out of the country. This is in effect mainly job creation at high cost to the taxpayer, a la subsidization of the motor vehicle industry.
I am all for supporting Australian industry and we could have done that effectively with helicopter platform upgrades rather than allowing local firms to be gobbled up by the multi-national corporates. I see potential opportunity to perhaps manufacture Super Tucano under licence independent of the big arms mobs. There could be significant cost savings for the Air Force in operating that common type to fulfil roles short of maritime strike and air combat capacity; but that would require overcoming the ingrained attitude that several squadrons must be maintained with top end capabilities.
Considering there is no imminent short-term threat, and if the intelligence/diplomatic agencies are performing their roles properly, surprising contingencies should never emerge. So the ADF just has to make the best of what it has in service until more suitable hardware choices are determined.
In such circumstances, the Super Hornet was an unnecessary knee-jerk reaction to hysteria generated by (inappropriate) withdrawal of the F-111. All to do of course with the overriding influence of the big arms defence lobby in Canberra. Adding more Super Hornets because the JSF is wobbly would only exacerbate this situation.
There will be no LEASE of additional Super Hornets. It's not in the US's interests to lease them to us, as they wont want them back.
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